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1. CHAPTER ONE 
1.1 Introduction 
 
According to the decision in Salomon1 a company is recognised as a legal entity 
separate and distinct from its shareholders. The court said:  
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum; and although it may be that after incorporation the business is 
precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the 
same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the 
subscribers or trustee for them.”2  
Although this fundamental rule has had a considerable influence in company law 
worldwide, it cannot be absolute and, as such, must allow for exceptions where the 
courts may disregard the separate legal personality of the company.3  
The general rule is that a court will pierce the corporate veil  
“only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade 
concealing the true facts, so that the separate existence of the company is in some 
sense being abused or, at least, is not being maintained in the full sense, with the 
result that separates between the company and its members does not in fact exist. 
However the courts uniformly exercise significant discretion, and fail to offer a clear 
standard for veil piercing.”4  
Besides company law, this research paper also considers other areas of law where 
this principle has been applied. These include labour law, criminal (corporate 
liability) and maritime law.  
The first part of this research paper investigates the reasons for the 
inconsistency of the application of the rule against piercing the corporate veil and 
considers if the traditional justifications for the rule as an exception remedy are valid. 
This part of research paper will begin with a discussion of the principle of separate 
liability, and its advantages and disadvantages will be considered. The application of 
the doctrine by the South African courts will also be discussed, and it will be 
                                                        
1 Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1987] AC 22 (HL). 
2 Ibid Lord MacNaughten at 51. 
3 EJ Cohn and C Smiths ‘Lifting the Veil In the Company Laws of the European Continent’ (1963) 12 
The International and Comparative Law Quarterly at 189. 
4 Sandra K. Miller ‘Piercing the corporate veil among affiliated companies in the European 
Community and the U.S.: A comparative Analysis of U.S, German and U.K.Veil piercing Approaches 












investigated whether inconsistency is due to the lack of established guidelines that 
could help the courts when dealing with cases involving piercing the corporate veil. 
The second part of the research paper considers the application of the 
principle of the corporate veil in the context of labour law. In today’s business world 
an employer can take the form of a natural person, a partnership, a ‘not for profit’ 
company, a limited liability company and an association of groups of companies. 
Some these forms have proved to be complex when identifying the true employer. 
For instance where an employee has been unfairly been dismissed and wishes to 
bring a claim against the employer, it is uncertain whether the parent company or its 
subsidiary is the employer. The identification of the true employer becomes 
increasingly challenging in the global context, with multinational companies 
establishing subsidiaries in foreign countries.5   
With regard to labour law, this research paper will investigate whether the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices constitutes a stronger justification for 
piercing the corporate veil than in other instances. The conclusion reached is that the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices is strong and justifiable and the courts are 
prepared to uphold the constitutional rights of employees. 
The third part of  deals with the maritime context where these principles 
apply to the operation by an individual ship owner of more than one vessel and 
sometimes a substantial fleet of vessels, the operations of which are managed and 
conducted centrally, although each is owned by a separate corporate entity.6 This 
research paper will investigate the contention that the reliance initially placed on the 
concept of piercing or lifting the corporate veil to justify the introduction of the true 
associated ship arrest was misplaced.7 An evaluation will be undertaken as to 
whether the justification for the departure from fundamental principles of company 
law embodied in the true associated ship arrest is lacking, and as such is a myth 
                                                        
5 Tamara Cohen ‘Placing Substance over form-Identifying The True Parties To An Employment 
Relationship’ (2008) 29 ILJ 863 at 870. 
6 Malcolm J. Wallis ‘The Associated ship and South African Admiralty Jurisdiction’ PhD dissertation 
University of Kwazulu Natal (2010)  at 100. 












which should be laid to rest and this language to describe the purpose or nature of the 
associated ship arrest provisions should cease.8  
This discussion will also consider the new provisions of the associated ship and 
comes to the conclusion that the introduction of the company law jurisprudence of 
piercing the corporate was the correct approach and that it should not be done away 
with. 
The fourth part of the reach paper deals with criminal liability of 
corporations. Being an artificial rather than natural person, a corporation is said not 
to be able to commit unlawful conduct, intentionally or negligently.9 The unlawful 
act and culpability of the individual servant or agent are then imputed to the 
corporate body.10 South Africa’s current approach to criminal liability of corporation 
is based on a derivative model of liability. This has been criticised, with some 
academics are in favour of the organisational model of corporate liable which, unlike 
the derivative model, which focuses on individual fault, instead looks to policies, 
institutional practices and corporate culture.   
Having considered both derivative and organisational models of corporate 
liability, this paper ends of by arguing that there is a need to consider adopting a 
more organisational model. In making this recommendation support for this 
proposition will be taken from other jurisdictions which have currently adopted 
organisational models of corporate liability. Australia will be considered as it is one 
of the countries that has adopted the organisational model of corporate liability. The 
United Kingdom will also be considered as it recently passed an act which 
specifically deals with corporate liability and has also been a source of influence in 
South African Law.  
 
                                                        
8 Ibid. 
9 Jonathan Burchell Principles of Criminal law 3ed (2005) at 562. 
10Louise Jordaan ‘New Perspective on the Criminal liability of Corporate bodies’ (2003) 48 Acta 












2.  CHAPTER TWO: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATION IN 
SOUTH AFRICA 
2.1  Separate personality  
 
The concept of separate legal personality of the company is in tandem with the 
doctrine of limited liability, although separate personality was a consequence of the 
Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, it took 53 years before the courts began 
addressing the implications of this separation in detail.11 Limited liability is a concept 
whereby shareholders' financial liability is limited to the amount of capital invested 
in the business and does not extend to personal assets. This principle is vital, as it oils 
the wheels of commerce. It enables business concerns to organise large amounts of 
capital from an extensive selection of investors who were reasonably reluctant to risk 
their whole personal fortunes in their investments. This effectively caps the 
investor’s risk and consequently, the potential for profit maximisation by the 
investors is unlimited.12 
In Foss v Harbottle,13 the court confirmed the idea that when a wrong is committed 
against a company, the company itself would be the plaintiff in the proceeding and 
not the members. This principle is also found in the Salomon case14 where it was 
held that the company is a separate legal person. In other words, the separate legal 
personality of a company enhances a different legal existence to the shareholders.15 
 A company may sue and be sued in its own name and holds property separately 
from its shareholders, as such the shareholders do not own the assets of the company, 
nor are they liable for its debts.16 As mentioned earlier it is this separate personality 
that makes companies more attractive to various investors, as the liability rests within 
the company, rather than the shareholders, directors, and the members of the 
company. This separate entity forms the basis for limited liability of shareholders 
liability of shareholders; their liability is limited to the actual value of the shares 
                                                        
11 Jacqui Cohen ‘Veil piercing a necessary Evil? A critical study on the doctrines of Limited liability 
and the corporate veil’ LLM Dessertation University of Cape Town (2006) at 7. 
12 Paul L.Davies, Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law 7ed (2003) at 176. 
13 Foss v Habottle (1843) 2 Hare 43; 67 E.R. 189. 
14 Salomon (note 1). 
15 Jacqui (note 11). 












allocated to them.17Lord Halsburg, held, “Once the company is legally incorporated 
it must be treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities 
appropriate to itself, and … the motive of those who took part in the promotion of the 
company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing what those rights and liabilities 
are.”18  
This having been stated its important to bare in minds that the court can still 
disregard the separate corporate personality in exceptional circumstances. It is 
necessary to have a clear understanding of the arguments both for and against the 
doctrine of limited liability.19  
On the one hand, if limited liability is viewed as unsound, then a liberal view will be 
taken towards veil piercing, whilst on the other hand, if viewed as  fundamental 
principle that should not be fettered, one would be more willing to restrict and limit 
the use of the doctrine of veil.20 
2.2  Advantages of limited liability  
 
Limited liability protects the company and its members, and it also facilitates 
commercial ventures in which the company may be interested.21 The principal 
argument in favour of limited liability stems from the common law rule of liability 
for joint-partners and several liabilities, where any one partner may be held liable for 
the entire amount of the firm’s debt.22   
This appears to be the general European rule as well.23 Under these conditions there 
are three economic arguments in favour of limited liability: (1) it fosters economic 
growth by encouraging investors to take risks; (2) it facilitates the efficient spread of 
risks among corporations and their voluntary creditors; and (3) it avoids the 
enormous litigation costs that would be required for creditors to seek recovery from 
shareholders.24 Limited liability reduces the transaction costs of collection.25 
Under a rule exposing equity investors to additional liability, the greater the wealth 
of other shareholders, the lower the probability that any one shareholder’s assets will 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 Salomon at 30. 
19 Jaqui (note 11 ) at 8. 
20 Stephen M. Bainbridge ‘Abolishing Veil Piercing’(2001) 26 J. Corp Journal of Corporate Law 
Spring 479 at 487. 
21 Stephen B Presser ‘Thwarting the killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability, Democracy and 
Economics’ 87 Nw.U. L. Rev. 148 at 177. 
22 Shaw Livermore ‘Unlimited Liability in Early American Corporations’ 43 Journal of Political 
Economy (1935) 674-687. 
23 William J.Carney ‘Limited Liability’5620(1999) at 669.  Available  at 
http://encyclo.findlaw.com/5620book.pdf [ Accessed on 22 November 2010].   
24 Ibid . 












be needed to pay judgement.26 Thus existing shareholders would have an incentive 
to engage in costly monitoring of other shareholders to ensure that they do not 
transfer assets to others or sell to others with less wealth. It also makes the identity 
of other shareholders irrelevant and thus avoids these costs.27 
Limited liability allows supplementary skilful diversification. Investors can 
diminish risk by owning a diversified portfolio of assets; firms can elevate 
investment at lower costs because investors need not bear the extraordinary risk 
associated with non-diversified holdings.28 It has been asserted that limited liability 
avoids the need for corporate creditors to bringing expensive and cumbersome 
individual collection suits against numerous scattered shareholders of corporations 
that have defaulted on their obligations.29 By including limited liability in 
corporation law, the law in effect creates an efficient contract term applicable to all 
transactions.30  
It eliminates the necessity for shareholders to incur the expense of contracting 
around liability.31 Where standard contract clauses are available as in the English 
insurance industry before the adoption of limited liability in The Companies Act, 
1862, such costs are trivial.32 However, where standard contract clauses are not 
available, limited liability in corporation law save the costs that otherwise would be 
incurred.33 
2.3  Disadvantages of Limited Liability 
 
By transferring the risk of liability from shareholders to creditors, limited liability 
increases the likelihood of excessively risky investments by business enterprises; the 
calculation has been distorted.34 This is a particularly serious problem.35 
                                                        
26 Easterbrook, Frank H. and Fischel, Daniel R ‘Limited Liability and the Corporation’ Vol 52. 
No.1University of Chicago Law Review Vol 52.No. 1 1985 89-117at 95. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid at 96. 
29 Robert C. Clark ‘The Regulation of Financial Holding Companies’(1979) 92 HARv. L. REv. 789, 
825-36 at 825. 
30 Philip I. Blumberg ‘Limited liability and Corporate Groups’ (1985-1986) 11 J.Coprp. L.573 at 615. 
31 Ibid at 615-616. 
32 Blumberg (note 30) at 616. 
33 Meiners, Mofsky & Tollison ‘Piercing the Veil of Limited Liability’ (1979) 4 J. CORP. L. 351 at 
363. 
34 Tony Orhnial ‘Limited Liability Laws and Corporate Finance in Limited  Liability and the 
Corporation’(1982) 179  T. Orhnial ed. at 186. 












 It is asserted frequently that the corporate group, particularly the multinational 
group, pursues a policy of group profit maximization in which the interests of the 
individual constituent companies are subordinated to the welfare of the entire 
group.36 This group focus is reflected in intra group allocations of resources for new 
investment to group activities yielding the highest return for programs of equivalent 
risk, transfer of funds and personnel, and non market intra group transfer pricing 
policies.37 
Professor Arrow has observed that limited liability is a departure from the free 
market and necessarily impairs its performance.38 If third parties have been misled 
about the identity of the entity with which they are dealing, and have been led to 
believe that they are dealing with the parent corporation or controlling shareholders, 
rather than with a financially weaker subsidiary or controlled corporation, the case 
for limited liability disappears.39 
 
2.4 Piercing the corporate veil in South Africa 
 
The principle of veil piercing seems to go against the notion of incorporation as the 
courts can still pierce the veil of incorporation and hold members personally liable, 
though this is generally done when an issues of fairness and fraud or dishonesty is 
involved. The principle set out in Salomon - th t a body corporate is a separate entity, 
separate that is from its members, led to use of the phrase the veil of incorporation, 
which is said to hang between the company and its members and  in law at least, act 
as a screen between them.40  
Cilliers & Benade41 examined the instances where the South African courts have 
disregarded the separate corporate personality of the company, and arranged these 
into seven categories. This approach will be followed in this work while bearing in 
mind that the approach taken by the courts appears to be determined on a case by 
case basis. 
The South African Courts have been careful to permit piercing of the veil of 
incorporation only in egregious cases.42 According to this area of law it is stated time 
and time again that courts pierce the veil reluctantly.43 Nevertheless it has always 
                                                        
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid Blumberg at 621. 
39 Ibid Blumberg. 
40 Denis Keenan and Josephine Bisacre Smith and Keenan’s Company Law 12ed (2002) at 25. 
41 H S Cilliers and  ML Benade Corpotate Law 3ed (2000) at 11-12. 













been recognised that the legislature can forge a sledge hammer capable of cracking 
open the corporate shell.44 
2.5  Disregarding by the legislature 
 
The following examples may be identified: 
In terms of section 50 (3) of the Companies Act,45 if a director, officer or agent of a 
company issues or signs a bill of exchange, a promissory note, a cheque or an order 
for money or for goods on behalf of the company in which the registered name of 
the company is not mentioned correctly, he commits an offence and is also 
personally liable for the holding of that bill of exchange, promissory note, cheque or 
order for the amount thereof, unless it is duly paid by the company. 
Section 66 of the Act provides for the liability of members of a public company for 
its debts in circumstances where the company’s membership is less than seven for a 
period of more than six months. 
Section 172(5) b of the Companies Act provides that until a certificate is issued 
permitting the company to commence business any debts or liabilities incurred prior 
to receipt of the certificate is the joint and several liability of the directors and the 
members of the company. Under section 344(h) of the Act a company may be 
wound up by the court if it appears to the court that it is just and equitable that the 
company should be wound up. 
Commenting on the above examples it is submitted that the legislature has always 
made an essential condition for the recognition of corporate personality an essential 
condition and that this should only be disregarded in instances mentioned. 
2.5 Disregarding by the Courts  
 
In exceptional circumstances the veil of incorporation has been lifted by the courts. 
The following are instances where the court has disregarded the separate corporate 
personality can be categorised.46 
(a) Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co47 in this case, the House 
of Lords held, that in spite of the decision in Salomon48 they were entitled to look 
beyond the fact that Daimler Co Ltd was incorporated in Great Britain, to the fact 
that all its members were domiciled in Germany, which was at the time at war with 
Britain, in order to be categorised as an alien enemy. 
                                                        
44 L. Nel ‘Piercing The Veil of Corporate Personality’(1992) Unpublished LLM  Dissertation 
University of  Cape Town at 6. 
45 Companies Act 61 of 1973 . 
46  This lay out of the instances had been taken from  the book by Benade (note 41) at 13. 
47 Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co [1916]. 












(b) In Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd,49 the South African 
Appellate Division realistically refused to take into consideration the separate 
existence of a company’s subsidiary where the company sought to use the subsidiary 
as “a device” in evading a director’s fiduciary duties to the holding company. 
(c) Where the fraudulent use is made of the rule of separate legal personality for 
the purposes of improper conduct.50  
(d) Where the courts seek to use the law of agency to evade the problems which 
would otherwise arise from a strict application of the principle in Salomon’s case. 
Davies argues that there is no presumption of any such agency relationship between 
the company and shareholders and in the absence of an express agreement between 
the parties; it will be very difficult to establish one.51 
(e) Tax liability; “as far as the tax liability of a company is concerned, the 
courts will not permit the true state of affairs to be concealed by the provisions in the 
company document (e.g. in the objections clause). Regard would be given to the real 
intention of the board of directors and the members.”52 The courts seem to be more 
concerned with the intentions of the company, for instance in the Elandsheuwel 
case,53 a company which had held land with a capital intention to a revenue one 
(became liable for tax on the proceeds), not because of any actions it took in 
connection with developing the land etc. but because its shareholding changed, and 
the new shareholders had a revenue intention with respect to the company’s assets, 
the land. 
(f) Underlying Partnership; the courts have recognised the existence of 
partnerships, in the case of Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Anos,54 where 
the underlying intention was one of partnership, although the partners formed a 
company to put the partner ship into effect. 
Embrahimi was removed  as director in agreement with the articles of association, 
Lord Wilberforce held, allowing the winding up of the company on the “just and 
equitable ground” that  “…a limited company is more than a mere legal entity with a 
personality in law of its own: that there is room in the company law for recognition 
of the fact that behind it or amongst it, there are individuals, with rights, expectations 
and obligations which are not necessarily submerged in the company structure.”55  
(g) Groups; 
(i) in the absence of fraud, the holding company, as incorporator  or otherwise of the 
subsidiary, is a separate legal persona possessing its own interests, rights, assets and 
liabilities. (ii) the mere fact that a holding company is able to control the subsidiary 
does not make the subsidiary its agent. As a consequence of the separate legal 
                                                        
49 Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd (1921) AD 168. 
50 Benade (note 41) ;the authors  also includes, Food and Nutrional Products (Pyt) Ltd v Newman 
1986(3) SA 464 in support of his point. 
51 Paul L.Davies Gower and Davies Principles of Modern Company Law 8ed (2008) at 203. 
52 Benade (note 41) at 14. 
53 Elandsheuwel Farming (Edms) Bpk v Sekretaris van Binnrlande Inkomste 1978 (1) SA 101 (A). 
54 Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd & Anos (1937) AC 360 (HL). 












personalities of the holding and subsidiary companies the subsidiary itself and not its 
holding company will have to institute actions and enforce its rights... The traditional 
common law approach is thus that holding and subsidiary companies possess their 
own legal personalities, rights, assets and liabilities.56 
Benade and Cilliers provide that while modern commercial practice has caused 
modifications (for example the presentation of group accounts) the holding company 
and its subsidiaries do not thereby lose their separate legal personalities.57 
2.6 Application of General principles through the cases 
 
General principles are important in several legal system as the application thereof 
ensures steadiness and expectedness in the legislation.58 Instances when the veil can 
be pierced seem to alter according to the judicial thinking of the time.59 It is 
submitted that there are no distinct instances where the courts have actually sat down 
to deal with aspects of the piercing the veil of incorporation, and the alike cases seem 
to used or considered in different instances of veil piercing. 
 The following discussion considers the different test and factors used by the 
court when piercing the corporate veil. It considers most of the leading cases in this 
area of law and also give a picture of how the judges have applied the principle of 
piercing the veil of incorporation. 
Firstly, In re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd, Warrington LJ stated that:  
“I am prepared to say that in a case like the present, where there are only 
two persons interested ... where there is no means of overruling by the 
action of a general meeting of shareholders the trouble which is occasioned 
by the quarrels of  the two directors and shareholders the company ought to 
be wound up if there exists such a ground as would be sufficient for the 
dissolution of a private partnership at the suit of one of the partners against 
the other. Such ground exists in the present case. I think it is therefore just 
and equitable that the company should be wound up.”60 
The court decided that it was just and equitable that a winding up order should be 
made. Secondly in Lategan v Boyes61  Loux J stated,  
                                                        
56 Benade (note 38) at 432 
57 Ibid at 433. 
58 Jaqui (note 11) at 27. 
59 Jennifer Payne ‘Lifting the Corporate Veil: A Reassessment of the Fraud Exception’ The 
Cambridge Law Journal (1997) 284 at 284. 
60 Judge Warrington In re Yenidje Tobacco Co Ltd [1916] 2 Ch 426 (CA), JT Pretorius, et el Hahlo’s 
South African Company Law through the cases 6ed (1999) at 25-6. 












“I have no doubt that our courts would brush aside the veil of corporate identity time 
and again where fraudulent use is made fiction of legal personality. In the present 
case, however, there is no evidence that the second defendant fraudulently failed to 
mention the position of the sureties. Blackman comments that in Lategan, the court 
did not intend to lay down such a strict fraud requirement, as there was no fraudulent 
conduct in the Lategan case.”62  
Although the court refused to lift the veil of incorporation, it held the second 
defendant personally liable on the grounds that he failed to discharge the onus 
incumbent on him to show that his surety meant he was prejudiced by the amending 
agreement.63 
  In Botha v van Niekerk,64 Flemming J stated, that the statement in Lategan 
regarding fraud was incorrect. Flemming J formulated a test for veil piercing which 
was somewhat wider than the Lategan rule.65 The court held that there was no 
liability attached to the first respondent and only the company be liable to the seller.  
The first respondent, he declared, could be held personally liable on the contract 
only if there was at least a conviction that the applicant had suffered unconscionable 
injustice as a result of what right-minded persons would perceive to be clearly 
improper conduct on the part of the first respondent. Applying this criterion to the 
facts before it, the court found that the applicant had, in terms of the contract, 
assumed risk that the nominee might be liable, without stipulating that the nominee 
had to have sufficient independent financial means to meet its obligations.66 
Furthermore, the possibility still existed at the time of application that the company 
could raise sufficient funds to enable it to pay the seller. For these reasons the courts 
refused to pierce the veil of  incorporation, and held that it could not arrive at a 
finding of personal liability of the first respondent for the amount owed to the seller 
by the company.67 
In Securitibank Ltd (No 2),68 Richmond P said: 
 “It may be… that the doctrine laid down in [the] Salomon [case]…has to be 
watched very carefully, but that can only be so if a strict application of the principle 
of corporate entity would lead to a result so unsatisfactory as to warrant some 
departure from the normal rule. I think that is particularly so in a case such as the 
present where there is no suggestion that the individual corporate entities . . .were in 
some way used to create a sham façade.69” 
 
                                                        
62 Jacqui (note 11) at 28. 
63 JT Pretorius at 26. 
64 Botha v van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). 
65 Andrew Domanski ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil- A New Direction’ (1986) SALJ 103 at 227. 
66 Ibid at 227. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Re Securitibank Ltd (No 2) 1978 2 NZLR 136 CA (NZ) at 158 -159. 












Similarly, in Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investment (pty) & others,70 the 
appellate Division held that, 
 “the law is far from settled with regard to the circumstances in which it would be 
permissible to pierce the corporate veil. Each case involves a process of enquiring 
about the facts which once determined, may be of decisive importance… Courts 
should not lightly disregard a company's separate personality, but should strive to 
effect to and uphold it… But where fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct 
(and I confine myself to such situations) are found to be present, other 
considerations will come into play.” The need to preserve the separate corporate 
identify would in such circumstances have to be balanced against policy 
considerations which arise in favour of piercing the corporate veil…and a court 
would be entitled to look at the substance rather than form, in order to arrive at the 
true facts, and if there has been a misuse of corporate personality to disregard it and 
attribute liability where it should rightly lie.”71 
In The shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon corporation,72 Corbett 
CJ stated that,  
“I do not find it necessary to consider, or attempt to define the circumstances under 
which the Court will pierce the corporate veil. Suffice to say that they would 
generally have to include an element of fraud or other improper conduct in the 
establishment or use of the company or the conduct of its affairs.”73 
In Hulse-Reutter & Others v Godde74 it was contended that the courts should pierce 
the veil in instances of improper or fraudulent conduct.75 In this case, [The 
shareholders] had caused [the company] to enter into the agreement with no 
intention of [the company] ever honouring its obligations in terms of the agreement. 
The court held that, “there can be no doubt that the separate legal personality of a 
company is to be recognised and upheld except in the most unusual 
circumstances…Much will depend on a close analysis of the facts of each case, 
consideration of policy and judicial judgment… There must at least be some misuse 
or abuse of the distinction between the corporate entity and those who control it 
which results in an unfair advantage being afforded to the latter.”76 
In Hulse-Reutter, the court departed from the Cape Pacific case without expressly 
stating so, and seemed to have reintroduced the requirement of unfair advantage into 
the test in determining whether or not to pierce the veil.77 Cape Pacific expressly 
avoided holding that there must always be an unfair advantage before the court can 
pierce the veil, as this requirement was regarded as being too rigid.78 
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Cape Pacific was decided on a flexible test and thus did away with the 
rigidity of Botha v van Niekerk. However, the court in Hulse-Reutter reverted to a 
rigid test (without an explanation as to why it did so).79 It is very difficult to 
reconcile Cape Pacific and Hulse-Reutter, because Hulse-Reutter required there to be 
an unfair advantage as well as“no other remedy available.”80 
2.7 Evaluation 
 
Having considered the cases discussed above, the courts attempt to categorise or 
rather create some form of guidance when piercing the corporate veil has its faults. 
For instance, the guideline for piercing the corporate veil in the ‘interest of justice,’ 
are vague and gives very little guidance as to when separate legal personality should 
be disregarded.81 
The courts also pierce the veil of incorporation on the basis of fraud, in an  
attempt to achieve justice for the parties involved.82 The authors83 state that 
traditionally the prevention of injustice was merely a category used for 
determining whether or not the veil should be pierced. This was argued upon, 
as an exception to the separate personality of the company, with other 
exceptions being subsets of this general principle, aimed at preventing an 
injustice to the parties concerned.84 
 As mentioned above it is evident the courts will pierce the corporate veil when there 
is merely a sham, although it is somewhat problematic to identify what exactly 
amounts to a sham. 
Gallagher and Ziegler85 put forward  a very convincing argument by stating 
that the different reasons for piercing the corporate veil for instance fraud, unlawful 
activities, avoidance of obligations, all are as a result the outcome of some sort of 
injustice. Most of the judges in the cases seem to be reluctant to set down principles, 
thus piercing the corporate veil is seen as an exceptional remedy and its boundaries 
are remarkably vague.  
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However, despite the criticisms of  Cilliers and Benade’s categorisation and 
the application of this doctrine being vague, it is argued that nonetheless, it does to 
some extent give some form of guidance to the courts when deciding on cases which 
involve piercing the corporate veil. Of course not every case will fall in a specific 
category. It is important that the courts determine whether the veil of incorporation 
should be pierced by taking into account the facts and circumstances surrounding the 
case. 
J B Cilliers & SM Luiz, submit that the corporate veil should be respected 
and not be interfered with too readily.86 A general discretion to disregard the separate 
personality of a company whenever it seems just, does not exist. However a strict 
application of the law in a case where exceptional factual circumstances are present, 
could result in an injustice.87 It is submitted that exceptional circumstances indeed 
existed in Cape Pacific. Even Van  Heerden JA, who delivered the dissenting 
judgement admitted  that, it was with regret he had to conclude that the corporate veil 
should not be pierced in this case.88 
 Andrew Domasnki89 submits that the grounds upon which the court in Botha 
sought to justify its refusal to pierce the corporate veil are unconvincing. The author 
opines that the arguments are based on convenience rather than principles of law. 
Domanski argues in favour of an approach in terms of which the policies behind 
recognition of a separate corporate existence must be balanced against the policies 
justifying piercing.90   
2.9  Conclusion  
 
The doctrine of limited liability is one of the most important principles of company 
law. It is at times referred to as the cornerstone of company law.  This principle 
played a huge role in the formation of companies today. One of its main advantages 
is the fact that investors and shareholders have limited liability and they only lose 
what they invested in the business. This encourages investment and economic 
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growth. It also has its fare share of disadvantages for instance; it increases the 
likelihood of unnecessarily risky investments. However it is submitted that the 
advantages seem to prevail over the disadvantages. 
The principle of limited liability is recognised and up held by the legislature 
and the courts, but is not unqualified. The veil of incorporation can be pierced thus 
imposing the company’s liability to its members in certain circumstances. The theory 
concerning the doctrine of piercing the veil of incorporation is undoubtedly lacking 
consistency.  
This is due among other reasons to the courts approach in handling each case 
on its particular facts. Reflecting back on the cases discussed above it is argued that 
it is virtually impossible for there to be no form of inconsistency in the application of 
the principles as the courts are taking into account different issues(on a case by case 
basis) which  will at the end of the day has some form of  influence on the decision. 
It follows that the courts seem to be reluctant in setting down existing guidelines as 
to how and when the veil of incorporation is pierced, and this has resulted in the lack 
of consistency in its application of the doctrine. The nature and complexity of cases 
that are brought before the courts are no doubt a factor in this. 
  However it is submitted that this principle has, been used and developed by 
the courts for a very long period of time. Given the change in corporate structures 
and how they are run, this principle has still kept up and is being applied even though 
it is said to be outdated. As a way of developing some guidance the courts developed 
the categorisation approach as when the veil of incorporation can be pierced in 
certain cases. The problem is that in instances where some cases could be placed in a 
category, it has been left to the courts to find way a of dealing with the situation.  
The legislature has recognised the principle of veil piercing and has also 
drawn up legislation pointing out certain instances when the veil of incorporation has 
pierced. It is submitted that the legislation in this area of law has not really done 
much to set up guiding principles for the courts. As a consequence of the afore 












guidance in ascertaining what will or will not result in a loss of limited liability 
through the piercing of the corporate veil.91 
Neither the legislature nor the judiciary has gone very far in protecting those dealing 
with the company from the dangers of incorporation with limited liability.92 While 
acknowledging incorporation’s right to exist independently, cognisance is taken of 
the fact that the corporate clock cannot be used to allow members blatantly using it 
for fraud or improper conduct.93 
Domanski suggests that the courts should adopt the Glazer principle; he 
argues that this principle is capable of resolving all problems posed by 
separate corporate identity.94 According to this test the policies behind 
recognition of a separate corporate existence must be balanced against the 
policies justifying piercing. He contends that this test does provide a coherent 
principle applicable to any piercing situation, something which cannot be said 
of its predecessors.95 
The Glazer decision is not of course the perfect answer to the problem but it does 
seek to unify and rationalise piercing decisions on the basis of a single underlying 
principle and may tidy up an untidy part of the law.96  
It is submitted that Milo is correct by stating that the Salomon doctrine is 
alive and well, subject to largely enigmatic exceptions made in concession to reality. 
He argues that it must be allowed to live on, for it is still good law in many 
situations.97 But, there is still a need for changes to be introduced in the law. There is 
sufficient material and brilliant suggestions that have been offered from the legal 
minds in the field and it is up to the legislature to take up some of the 
recommendations put forward. 
3.   CHAPTER THREE: VEIL PIERCING – LABOUR ILLUSTRATION 
 
3.1 The Employment Relationship 
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The first question to be asked when on the lookout to resolve any labour law problem 
is whether the parties are indeed ‘employees’ and ‘employers’ within the meaning of 
the applicable statute and/ or the common law.98  
This can be achieved by looking to the contract which has been entered into by the 
parties.99 The contract of employment has been defined as a contract between two 
persons, the master (employer) and the servant (employee), for the letting and hiring 
of the latter’s services for reward, the master being able to supervise and control the 
servant’s work.100 
A number of issues and principles have to be borne in mind when considering the 
employment contract as a whole.101 It is for example, always necessary to bear in 
mind that the employment relationship is not one of equality- the employer, as a 
rule, will have considerably more economic power than the employee.102 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) defines an employee as (a) any person, excluding 
an independent contractor, who works for another person or for the State, and who 
receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration; and (b) any other person who in 
any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the business of an employer.103  
The civil courts have frequently struggled with the difficulty of differentiating 
between an independent contractor and persons who are ‘entitled to receive payment 
or someone who assists in conducting the business of an employer’.104 
The legislature has of late attempted to offer guidance to the courts with a 
new deeming provision, in section 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(BCEA)105 and 200A of the LRA.106 The word employer is not defined in the LRA. 
An employer, by implication, will be any person who receives services from an 
employee for payment or is assisted in the conduct of its business by an employee.107 
Situations may arise where what is presented as  an employer is ‘an empty 
legal shell stripped of its assets while the real power of decision-making and the 
ability to pay wages rests with another company or person.108 Under such 
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circumstances, it has been argued, the company or other person or persons who 
[have] control of the undertaking in which the worker is employed should be 
regarded as the employer.109 This will be dealt in more details in the paragraphs 
below. 
3.2  Piercing the Corporate Veil  
 
An employer can take the form of a natural person, a partnership or a variety of 
corporate entities including a company, or close corporation. The formation and 
utilization of these corporate structures is implicitly recognized and regulated by 
corporate law.110 Shareholders of limited liability companies are protected by virtue 
of the principle of separate legal personality which affords them protection from 
personal responsibility for the company's actions or responsibilities,111 as are 
members of close corporation sheltered from individual liability for the behaviour of 
the company. Subsidiaries also possess their own legal personalities, rights, assets 
and liabilities.112 
Liability for the unfair dismissal of or discrimination against an employee, or 
subjecting an employee to unfair labour practice, vicarious liability for an 
employee's actions or the breach of statutory duties owed to an employee falls 
squarely on the responsible corporate structure, and controlling shareholders, 
directors and members are indemnified from personal responsibility.113  
Thus the courts might pierce the veil of incorporation in order to expose the true 
employer.  
Furthermore the veil of incorporation will be pierced where the “dichotomy between 
a company between and natural person behind it (or in control of its activities)’114 is 
disregarded and liability is attributed ‘to that person where he has misused or abused 
the principle of corporate personality.”115 
 Where the company is used as a façade for the attaining of improper objectives or is 
used as the alter ego of the controlling shareholders to further their own business or 
affairs, piercing the corporate veil is appropriate and the protections afforded to the 
directing minds of the company are waived.116  
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By using the company “as a mere instrumentality or business conduit for promoting, 
not its own business or affairs but those of its controlling shareholders,”117 
shareholders are regarded as having abused the company's separate legal identity.118 
While it is not essential to establish an intent to deceive, evidence of the improper 
misuse of these separate entities resulting in an injustice would have to be established 
before this exceptional relief will be granted.119 
Where a close corporation in fact trades on its own account, the employee is deemed 
the employee of the close corporation, not of the person to whom the close 
corporation renders service.120 However, there may be situations in which a court 
will pierce the veil of incorporation of the close corporation in order to identify the 
true relationship between its members and the person to whom it renders service.121 
The following paragraphs will consider the approach taken by the courts in 
identifying the true employer and the difficulties involved. Contracts between 
employees and subsidiaries in groups of companies aggravate this problem. In these 
cases, it must be decided whether an employment relationship exists between the 
alleged employee and the alleged employer.122 
In Board of Executors Ltd v McCafferty,123 Mr McCafferty had initially been 
employed by BOE Ltd but was later transferred to one of its subsidiaries within the 
BOE stable, BOE Merchant Bank. His appointment was confirmed in a letter under a 
BOE Ltd letterhead and that company paid his salary. Later he was retrenched a  
letter under a BOE Ltd letterhead, informed him of his retrenchment. He instituted 
action for unfair dismissal citing BOE Merchant Bank as the respondent employer. 
The court substituted BOE Ltd as the respondent. On appeal BOE Ltd denied it was 
McCafferty’s employer, and claimed that all its employees were in fact employed by 
BOE Merchant Bank. The court found no foundation to pierce the corporate veil of 
BOE Ltd to institute that BOE was in fact the true employer. It was held that it was 
possible for an employee to have more than one employer and that while the terms of 
the employment contract and its object determine the nature of the relationship 
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between the parties, the parties' perceptions and the manner in which the contract is 
carried out are also of assistance.124 
The current labour courts have indicated a willingness to pierce the corporate 
veil in order to identify the true employer in circumstances where there is clear 
evidence of the abuse of juristic personality.125  
In Airlink Pilots Association SA v SA Airlines (Pty) Ltd & another126 the court was 
required to consider an urgent application contesting the alleged unilateral variation 
of the applicant pilots' terms and conditions of employment, that required them to 
forego the seniority system that had been recognized as a promotion criteria in terms 
of a collective agreement concluded with the first respondent. The dispute arose after 
the applicants were required to resign from their employment with the first 
respondent and take up employment with the second respondent which being a 
separate legal entity, was not bound by the seniority system.127 
The court noted that, for the applicant to succeed, the veil of incorporation 
would have to be pierced. The court considered case law on the prerequisites for 
lifting the corporate veil, particularly the factor of fraud or improper conduct in 
relation to a particular transaction. 
In this matter the question to be determined was not who the real employer 
was, but who the real decision maker was with regard to the abandoning of 
the seniority system and the amendment of other terms and conditions of 
employment. The facts established that the first respondent controlled the 
second respondent to the extent that it was the sole decision maker, 
particularly with regard to the employment of pilots. The court held that the 
re-employment requirement and the resultant avoidance of the pilots' 
seniority system, was not a decision which emanated from the second 
respondent but from the first respondent and appeared to be a device to 
change the terms and conditions of the employment relationship between the 
first respondent and the applicant. Based on this the court was prepared to 
grant the application.128  
In Buffalo Signs Co Ltd & others v De Castro & another,129 the court concluded that 
the retrenchment process was flawed and substantively and procedurally unfair and 
that the second appellant was liable to compensate the respondents.130  
The respondents then obtained an order in the Industrial Court (IC) against all the 
appellants jointly and severally. The LAC considered the correctness of such an 
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order and concluded that the IC was limited to ordering compensation against the 
employer. The fact that the third appellant was in all likelihood an accomplice to the 
second appellant's deceit did not render such party an employer. The court pointed 
out that there was no fictional employer and the true employer is the party that fits 
the definition of employer. The true employer, the court noted, 'may be plucked from 
his hiding place behind the corporate veil'.131  
The facts established that the second appellant paid the respondents and were 
the perpetrators of the fraud upon the respondents. That the third appellant was the 
controlling company of the second appellant did not, on this basis alone, transform it 
into the employer of the respondents.  
The LAC's willingness to disregard corporate personality was evidenced in 
the recent decision of 132 Footwear Trading CC v Mdlalose.133  Nicholson JA 
noted that:  “The abuse of juristic personality occurs too frequently for comfort and 
many epithets have been used to describe the abuse against which the courts have 
tried to protect third parties, namely puppets, shams, masks and alter ego. However, 
the general principle underlying this aspect of the law of lifting the veil is that, when 
the corporation is the mere alter ego or business conduit of a person, it may be 
disregarded. The lifting of the veil is normally reserved for instances where the 
shareholders or individuals hiding behind the corporate veil are sought to be 
responsible. I do not see why it should not also apply where companies and close 
corporations are juggled around like puppets to do the bidding of the puppet 
master.”134 
The court concluded that Fila and Footwear were separate legal personalities but the 
effect of the machinations of Mr K, director and shareholder of Fila and managing 
member of Footwear, and his staff was such that they were in effect joint or co-
employers. To the extent that Footwear wanted it otherwise, it was prevented from 
denying that fact by virtue of the numerous representations that were made that either 
Footwear was the employer or Footwear and Fila were joint employers. 
Furthermore in Camdons Realty (Pty) Ltd v Hart135 the appellant had engaged 
the employee to work for a company to be formed, B. An employment contract was 
eventually signed between the employee and B. In subsequent proceedings brought 
by the employee against the appellant, the appellant took the point that B, and not it, 
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was the employer. The Labour Appeal Court found that B was merely a legal shell 
and that it was the appellant who provided work for the employee.136 
In PPWAWU v Lane NO137 the court established that the liquidation of a close 
corporation and the simultaneous creation of a second one to take its place was a 
deceptive device used, among other things, to get rid of part of the work-force 
without having to retrench them. The court was accordingly prepared to hold the 
reconstituted close corporation liable for the dismissal of employees.138 
 Likewise, in Viljoen v Wynberg Travel (Pty) Ltd139it was supposed that the business 
of the close corporation was so entangled with  that of the respondent company, that 
the respondent may well be regarded the real employer of the applicant.140 
In Gaymans  v Ben Ngomeni141 “the court was equipped to lift the veil of 
incorporation to establish the true identity of the employer in circumstances where 
his conduct was at best, disingenuous, and at worst, dishonest; and there is ample 
evidence of improper conduct.”142  
3.3  Foreign Owned Companies 
 
With the increasing incursion into the South African economy of Multinational 
companies, the problem of identifying the true employer may become more 
complex.143 Through the growth in trade between nations, some companies will cross 
boarders and establish subsidiaries on foreign soil.  
The courts have had to consider whether a person, employed by a foreign holding 
company to manage a South African subsidiary is employed by the holding 
company, thereby falling outside of the jurisdiction of South African labour law or is 
employed by the local subsidiary.144  
In Pearson v Sheerbonnet South Africa (Pty) Ltd 145 the court held that 
the managing director was not an employee of the subsidiary but the foreign 
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holding company, and consequently falls outside the jurisdiction of the South 
African Courts. 
In August Läpple (South Africa) v Jarrett & others146 the court declined to 
follow this interpretation and held that even though the applicant was employed by 
the parent company, he was considered  also an employee of  the subsidiary as the  
director, and was paid by and accountable to the board of the subsidiary. 
 The court noted that a managing director, like an ordinary employee, was 
unrestricted to the protection of South African law and that the true nature of the 
relationship should be established by reference to the terms of the contract and the 
ordinary tests used to determine the presence of an employment relationship, most 
notably the dominant impression test.147 
The court stated that: 'If externally based companies, like LAG, were led to believe 
by the courts that they were free to avoid the reach or ambit of the LRA by merely 
resorting to the simple stratagem of contractually providing that persons (who are 
clearly employees within the meaning of the very widely defined word ''employee' in 
the LRA) are not employees of internally based subsidiaries, there would be 
complete and total disadvantage to South African citizens working for these foreign 
companies.' The court held that the dominant impression indicated that the applicant 
was an employee of both the subsidiary and the holding company.148 
3.4  Conclusion  
 
The traditional view in terms of limited liability is that it must be  respected, and only 
in certain exceptional circumstances should the veil of incorporation be pierced. It is 
submitted that the labour courts are more willing to disregard or pierce the veil of 
incorporation to expose the true employer. There seems to be consistency in the 
cases mentioned at above when dealing with issues concerning unfair dismissals and 
where corporations try and hide behind the empty shell corporations. Most of the 
decisions seem to be policy driven, as the courts strive to come to decisions which 
are in line with the constitution. Unlike the commercial courts, the labour courts do 
not go on to try and establish or design new tests when it comes to dealing with cases 
involving veil piercing.  
In Airlink,149 the employers attempt to change the employees working terms 
and conditions by trying to use the second respondent and claiming to be a separate 
entity, could only  be resolved by piercing of  the corporate veil to identify the true 
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identity of the person who was actually responsible for decision making with regard 
to the two corporations. It is submitted that the courts were correct in coming to this 
decision and hence the piercing of the veil was  justified in this case. 
This notion of piercing the veil in the labour perspective has been criticised.  
Deakin argues that the idea is so vague that there is inevitably an air of arbitrariness 
about its application, whatever the outcome. He states that there is a need for a more 
functional conception of the legal personality at an  enterprise, one which looks 
beyond the form in which the owners or controllers of a business choose to 
constitute it to take into account the role and interests of the other stakeholders, 
employees included.150  
Despite the criticism, it is submitted that the doctrine of veil piercing has proved to 
be workable and efficient. Employers had attempted to deceive their employees by 
forming an empty legal shell. However the courts have been able to look behind the 
veil to see what is actually going on. 
As mentioned above the establishment of foreign subsidiaries in South Africa 
has led to difficulties in identifying the true employer when the employee has been 
employed by the foreign parent company. In Pearson the court was incorrect by 
leaving the employee without a remedy because they could not claim jurisdiction. It 
is argued that the decision was unconstitutional, because under section 23 of the 
constitution,151 everyone has the right to fair labour practice which includes being  
given a remedy failure of which goes against the constitution. 
Hence the court in August Läpple,152 declined to follow the earlier decision, 
as they rightful concluded that, this will mean South African citizens working for 
overseas corporations would be disadvantaged. Persons employed outside the 
territorial boundaries of the Republic are not bound by South African Legislation, 
unless perhaps, the contract is finished in South Africa, the parties expressly or 
implicitly accepted the jurisdiction of the South African courts, or their employer is 
based in South Africa. Conversely, foreign companies operating inside the Republic 
are bound by the South African labour Acts.153 
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To this end the paternalistic nature of South African labour legislation, permitted by 
constitutional safeguards, casts a wide net around the identification of employers and 
employees. This, together with a willingness on the part of the judiciary to adopt a 
purposive interpretation of statutory and contractual provisions in order to uncover 
the substance and not the form of the working relationship, has diffused many of the 
difficulties posed by disguised employment relationships.154 
 
4.   CHAPTER FOUR: THE ASSOCIATED SHIP IN MARITIME LAW 
 
4.1 Background to the associated ship arrests 
 
A person seeking to claim in maritime law can find that it proves difficult.  
Situations arise where the debtor is in all likelihood a shell company registered in an 
obscure jurisdiction with its sole asset a ship that tramps the jurisdiction of the 
maritime world.155 Failing satisfaction of its claim, creditors would take action 
against the owner of the ship by attaching any one of the ships to the ships of the line 
to found jurisdiction of the court.156  
This was known as the ‘sister ship’ procedure, which allowed a claimant to arrest the 
particular ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose, or any other ship which 
is owned by the person who was, at the time when the maritime claim arose, the 
owner of the particular ship in respect of which the claim arose.157 
 In fact it was this same self-legitimating of the sister ship procedure in the eyes of 
the international community which contributed to its downfall as an effective means 
of recovering debts of one ship from another: ship owning companies were quick to 
limit the exposure of their fleets by re-financing their ship into one-ship 
companies.158  
Because of the separate legal personalities of such companies, the claimant could 
proceed only against the ‘guilty ship.’159 But because ships are notoriously elusive, 
and even when one is arrested, it usually happens that the amount of the claim 
exceeds the value of the ship.160 
When drafting of the South African Act, the ‘brass-plate’ ship owning 
company was the norm, South Africa adopted an innovative approach to sister ship 
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arrest and as a result extended the concept of lifting the corporate veil to a maritime 
application.161  
The concept of an associated ship ( The Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act 1983) 
goes considerably further than the sister ship provision in going behind the separate 
corporate personality of ship-owning companies to their controlling interests and on 
the basis of common control, providing that ships are associated.162 
  The effect of the associated ship provisions of the Act is therefore to provide 
a remedy additional to those contemplated by the sections enabling proceedings in 
personam and in rem.163 Having laid out a brief history of an associated ship concept 
the following paragraphs consider the justifications for the introduction or fusion of 
the company law concept of piercing the corporate veil into maritime law. This will 
be mostly based on Judge Willis’164 analysis of the justificati ns for the associated 
ship arrest.  
4.2 Piercing the Corporate Veil 
 
The principles of company law related to, the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil 
will not be considered on this occasion as it has already been dealt with in Chapter 
two. This having been said the following undertaking has been aligned with the 
background of the general pr nciples of company law, and the general development 
of maritime law. It is apparent that as a point of departure there is a needto examine 
the basis upon which the company law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil was 
extended to apply in maritime law. 
4.3 Reasons for the introduction of associated ship provisions 
 
It all began with the changing pattern of ship ownership that had seen an ever-
growing proportion of ship owners moving away from national registries and 
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registering their vessels under flags of convenience, usually in one-ship 
companies.165  
The associated ship provisions were introduced, in accordance with the South 
African Law Commission, in an attempt to defeat the proliferation of single-ship 
companies variously described as “asset-poor” or “brass-plate” concerns.166  
Hence a shipowner with having more than one ship could assign his ships to be 
owned separately by different individual companies, thus ensuring that one ship 
would not be arrested in respect of a claim against another ship, this occurs because 
of the legal personalities of such companies, the claimant could proceed against only 
the guilty ship.167 
Shaw states that, although often referred to in such pejorative terms as a scheme or 
device, this was and is a perfectly legitimate utilization of the advantages which the 
limitation of liability under the company laws is designed to give.168 The South 
African courts recognize that in some cases it is proper to disregard the apparent 
existence of the company because the company is, as it is frequently put, a mere 
sham or has been set as a step in a fraud. Shaw also states that, cases of this nature 
may still be relevant despite the associated ship provisions,. Reference should be 
made, to these cases if for instance, it is desired to show that the ship to be arrested 
although ostensibly owned by company A, is in fact owned by another natural 
person, whether natural or corporate.169  
“According to the Minister of Justice,170 the associated ship provision extends a 
principle of South African law, which can be summarized thus: Although the 
principle of the sanctity of a separate corporate personality of a company distinct 
from its members was enshrined in Salomon v Salmon, our courts should brush aside 
the veil of corporate identity time and again where fraudulent use is made if the 
fiction of legal personality.”171 
Wallis argues that close examination suggests that the foundation is lacking 
for this resort to company law for a justification of the associated ship arrest 
provisions in their broadest significance.172 It is submitted that there is a firm 
foundation already set in terms of the company law doctrine of piercing the veil, the 
principle is not alien at all, it is a widely recognised principle of law. Hence it should 
not really pose much of a problem as the courts still have the authority and power to 
pierce the veil under certain circumstances. 
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It follows that another justification for the introduction of this jurisdiction in 
maritime law, is that from a business perspective, the registration of vessels in this 
form is a completely justifiable business decision and has its own advantages.  
Wallis states that the nature of the industry is such that from an operational 
viewpoint shipowners are highly mobile and in a position to take advantage of fiscal 
benefits and cost savings that arise if they move their base of operations from one 
jurisdiction to another.173 Also that there is no reason why their vessels should 
remain registered in a high-cost, high-tax jurisdiction when they can with equal ease 
and no disadvantage be registered in a low-cost, low-tax jurisdiction, particularly if 
their base of operations for the purposes of management can remain the same.174 
From an economic point of view, Wallis says;  
that by creating an entity separate from the natural persons engaged in the business 
and limiting the liability of those persons a number of purposes can be achieved 
which are in general conducive to the promotion of investment and entrepreneurial 
activity.175 
Professor Manne176 maintained that limited liability in many enterprises, means they 
can operate with-out risking a disastrous loss if any corporation under which they 
have invested becomes insolvent.177 In other words, the rule facilitated 
diversification of risk.178 Furthermore he argued, the rule promotes efficiency 
because it is less costly for the creditors of a corporation to assess the risks of 
investment than it is for many small shareholders.179 Posner asserts that limited 
liability facilitates a form of transaction advantageous to both investors and creditors; 
in its absence the supply of investment and the demand for credit might be much 
smaller than they are.180  
The underlying argument was originally and remains that by enabling investors to 
divide their other assets from those of the business and from attack by the creditors 
of the business or, to a lesser extent, by enabling the business to divide its assets 
from the assets and liabilities of its investors, the raising of capital is facilitated as 
the risks involved in the venture are clearly defined at the outset.181 This in turn 
promotes entrepreneurial activity for the general benefit of the economy and creates 
investment markets in which investors can participate secure in the knowledge that 
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the financial soundness of their fellow investors is in large measure irrelevant to 
their investment decisions.182 
Furthermore in justifying the reasons for the introduction of this 
jurisprudence it is worth discussing the reasons for the formation of groups by 
companies as this goes in line with the drastic change that took place in the shipping 
industry (companies establishing subsidiaries to run their ships). The following 
discussion looks at only five reasons. 
(a) Centralised Control and Decentralised Administration 
Centralised control in the holding company with decentralised management in its 
subsidiary makes possible the implementation of a group policy which combines the 
advantages of large scale production and the efficiency of small- scale production.183 
Separate boards of directors and staffs or administrative officers for each subsidiary 
may have the effect of enabling those businesses to be operated more efficiently and 
economically than if from a central point, this way cumbersome management 
structures can also be avoided.184  
(b) Unified Financing 
The holding company may act as the financial superstructure of the whole group and 
a subsidiary may find it easier to obtain credit because of its identification with the 
holding company, the holding company could also finance the whole group which 
through its size would have easier access to the investing public.185 
(c) Pyramiding of Companies 
This enables the control of subsidiaries by a holding company through the 
investment of a relatively small amount of capital, this will involve a holding 
company  holding  of the minimum amount of shares in a subsidiary to make the 
latter a subsidiary in terms of section 1(3) of the Act186 this process will can be 
repeated many times by subsidiary upon subsidiary.187 This arrangement in effect 
makes the control of the whole group possible through control of the ultimate 
holding company.188 
(d) The Separation of a Company’s Business Activities  
The separation of a company’ business activities into separate departments by the 
use of subsidiaries becomes possible in a holding company/ subsidiary relationship, 
this may be called for where one of the subsidiaries is engaged in a new or risky 
undertaking and the holding company seeks to limit its potential liability to the 
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capital subscribed by it.189 In this manner the insulation of companies form the 
creditors of other companies within the group can be achieved.190 
Having considered the justifications for the introduction of this company law 
jurisprudence it is important to also examine its application in terms of cases 
involving associated ship arrest. 
4.4 The associated ship provisions 
 
The amended Admiralty Jurisdiction Regulation Act No. 87 of 1992, brought 
changes to the provisions dealing with associated ship. The definition of an 
associated ship was altered to incorporate the notion of common law control of the 
companies owning the vessels.191 Like the old Act, the new provisions are not 
retrospective, provision was dealt with in National Iranian Tanker Co. v The Pericles 
GC.192 
Mr. Justice Shearer held that “the test was whether the amendment had brought 
within its net a company or vessel which was not there before. And if the amendment 
has so brought a company or vessel which was not there before into the net, the 
amendment is not retrospective.”193 In the Appellate Division it was held that the 
amended provisions did not have retrospective effect because “it would operate in a 
manner which prejudiced shipowners by creating burdens or obligations that did not 
exist before,”194 it “would interfere with existing rights and create new burdens.”195 
Furthermore, “the rights of innocent third parties could be adversely affected by 
giving the amending Act retrospective operation.”196 
Other relevant amendments dealing with the right to arrest an associated ship include 
sections 3(6) and 3(7). 
Section 3(6) states that subject to the provisions of subsection (9), an action in rem, 
other than such an action in respect of a maritime claim contemplated in paragraph 
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(d) of the definition of 'maritime claim', may be brought by the arrest of an 
associated ship instead of the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose.197  
This section appears to restrict the use of the associated ship provisions to action in 
rem, so where a claimant would ordinarily proceed in rem, they are given the option 
of proceeding against the vessel concerned or against an associated ship.198 
As provided for in section 3(4), actions in rem may be enforced where; (a) the 
claimant has a maritime lien over the property to be arrested; or (b) if the owner of 
the property to be arrested would be liable to the claimant in an action in personam 
in respect of the cause of action concerned. Whist section 3(4) read with section 3(5) 
provides that property, other than just the ship may be arrested to enforce an action 
in rem, section 3(6) limits the associated provisions to only one type of maritime 
property, namely the associated ship. 
 If the claimant therefore has a maritime claim which gives rise to a maritime lien or, 
in respect of which the owner of the associated ship is liable to the claimant in 
personam the associated ship may be arrested instead of the ship in respect of which 
the claim arose.199  
In The Fayrouz IV200, the Court held however that: “it is important that the 
associated ship provisions are intended to provide an alternative method of enforcing 
the claim in personam by an arrest if another ship instead of the guilty ship. The 
claim in personam remains even when an arrest is affected and an action in rem has 
been thus brought or instituted.”201 The court concluded that sections 3(6) and (7) 
provide an extension of the remedy provided by section 3(5) and an alternative action 
in rem.202 
Furthermore section (3) (7) (a) of the Act defines an associated ship; 
 as a ship, other than the ship in respect of which the maritime claim arose owned, at 
the time when the action is commenced, by the person who was the owner of the 
ship concerned at the time when the maritime claim arose;203 or owned, at the time 
when the action is commenced, by a person who controlled the company which 
owned the ship concerned when the maritime claim arose;204 or owned, at the time 
when the action is commenced, by a company which is controlled by a person who 
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owned the ship concerned, or controlled the company which owned the ship 
concerned, when the maritime claim arose.205 
It is the provisions that institute an association through common control that have no 
parallel in other maritime jurisdiction and that distinguish the South African 
associated ship arrest provision from sister ship or surrogate ship arrest provisions 
elsewhere.206 It is these provisions that contribute to South Africa’s reputation as an 
arrest friendly jurisdiction.207  
The section is supplemented by section 3(7)(b), this section provides support in 
establishing an associated ship during common ownership or control in the form of a 
deeming provision. 208  
Under the unamended provisions of section 3(7) of the 1983 Act, the guilty ship and 
the other ship are associated if the associated ship was “owned by a company in 
which the shares, when the maritime claim arose, were controlled or owned by a 
person who then controlled or owned the shares in the company which owned the 
guilty ship.209 
Several judgments have pointed out that control of the shares of a company is 
a different matter from control of the company itself.210 The question of what 
constitutes control was first dealt with by the court in EE Sharp & Sons Ltd v MV 
Nefeli,211 the case involved an admiralty action in rem for the attachment of the ship 
Nefeli. The ship was registered in Panama and owned by a Greek Company. The 
applicant’s maritime claims were in respect of goods supplied to the vessels alleged 
to be associated with the ship or sister ships. The question was whether similar orders 
could be granted to enforce the claims against the associated ship in terms of section 
3(6). All the ships concerned were owned by separate companies.  
King AJ observed; 
 “this is precisely the situation which the section is intended to create for, namely a 
series of “one ship” companies, all controlled by the same interests, but previously 
because of their separate legal personalities immune from attachment in respect of 
debts incurred in respect of the sister ship.”212  
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King AJ granted the application, basing his decision on the deeming provision 
contained in paragraph (b) (ii):213 stating, “in my view this relates to overall control, 
such as is exercisable for instance by a majority shareholder or his nominee, of the 
assets and destiny of the company; it does not refer to its day to day management and 
administration.”214 
 In Zygos Corporation v. Salen Rederierna AB,215 Mr Justice Friedman 
observed that for the purposes of section 3(7), in its original form, it is possible for a 
person to control a company without necessarily controlling the shares in that 
company.216 Similarly, Mr. Justice Majid has pointed out that “there is a vast 
conceptual and factual difference between control of the management of a 
company’s affairs and control of the shares in that company.”217 These view have 
been confirmed the by the Appellate Division.218 
 Control over a company can be exercised, for instance, without a majority 
shareholding where voting rights are not commensurate with shareholding, or where 
“pyramiding” takes place.219 That consideration, together with the appreciation that 
actual control or ownership of shares may be extremely difficult to prove (especially 
since such matters are not made public in some jurisdictions), resulted in the 1992 
amendment so that control of a company is no longer linked to control of ownership 
of shares.220 In other words, under the amended section 3(7), control of the company 
relevant in determining real power, in contrast to control or ownership of the shares 
under the original provision.221 
Another difficulty, has been the explanation of the expression “power, directly or 
indirectly, to control in section 3(7)(b)(ii) which provides that a person shall be 
deemed to control a company if he has power, directly or indirectly, to control the 
company.’ 
 In MV Heavy Metal Belfry Marine Ltd v Palm Base Maritime SDN BHD,222 
the vessel arrested as an “associated” ship was owned by a corporation whose 
common shareholder and only director was one Lemonaris, a Cypriot 
advocate.  
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That in itself would have been sufficient to establish common control had the facts 
not been complicated by his assertion that he was a merely the nominee shareholder 
for different beneficial or actual holders of the shares in each of the shipowning 
companies.223 It had, in fact, been conceded on the arresting creditor’s paper that Mr 
Lemonaris was probably a nominee and merely a post-box.224 
The matter was further complicated by the fact that Mr Lemonaris contended 
initially that the laws of Cyprus precluded him from divulging the identity of the 
actual or beneficial owners of the shares in the respective shipowning companies.225 
The court a quo dismissed an application to set the arrest of the Heavy Metal 
aside.226  
Having gone on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal the issue of the interpretation 
of the phrase “the power, directly or indirectly, to control,” was considered; 
the majority of the court which was split three to two on this issue held that the 
section identified two sources of possible control: direct and indirect control.227 It 
equated “direct control” in the Act with de jure control of the company, namely the 
control exercised by the registered majority shareholder as the person who, 
according to the register of the company controls its destiny.228 
 Indirect control, it held, meant de facto control of the company, namely the power 
to control a company that would be wielded through someone who had direct control 
of the company, as would be the case with the beneficial or actual owner holding 
shares in a company through a nominee.229  
If the same person, so the reasoning continued, exercised de jure power to control 
both the company owning the “guilty” ship and the company owning the targeted 
ship, the statutory nexus between the ships would be established, if the de jure 
control resided in different hands, it would be open to the arresting creditor establish 
that the same person, or entity was in de facto control.230 
On this interpretation of the wording of the wording of the section and the facts then, 
Mr Lemonaris as registered majority shareholder was the person in direct control of 
both companies at the relevant time, as to the identities of the indirect controllers of 
the shares in the respective companies. The court was confronted with the refusal to 
identify both those persons and the uncorroborated assertion that they were not one 
and the same.231 
  To the majority the word “or” in “directly or indirectly, to control,” meant the 
arresting party could rely on either form of control, since common arrest has been 
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established, the arresting creditor had an association between the vessel and the arrest 
had to stand.232 
For an associated ship to be liable for arrest, it is sufficient if it is owned at 
the time when the action is commenced by a natural person or company, or “any 
other juristic person and body of person, irrespective of whether or not any interest 
therein consists of shares”233 this provision applies to all forms of corporate 
ownership of ships by virtue of section 3(7)(a)(iii) which provides that a company 
includes any other juristic person and any body of persons’ irrespective of whether 
any interest therein consists of shares. It does however ensure that whatever form of 
corporate ownership may be adopted in relation to a ship it will be possible to apply 
the associated ship provision in relation thereto.234  
So where a natural person owns the guilty ship directly and also “owns” the 
associated ship indirectly through a company, that ship may be subject to arrest.235It 
follows that the new amendment to section 3(7) now casts the net of liability much 
wider: it equates the owner of the ship with any charterer (whether it be demise, time 
or voyage charterer) with the owner of the ship.236 
4.5 The Provisions as an Extension of Existing Rights and Remedies 
 
Diverse views have been articulated on the associated ship provisions. These 
provision have been viewed as an extension of the existing rights and remedies, 
firstly  by the South African Law commission,  who when motivating for the 
introduction of the associated ship provisions described them as a logical extension 
of the notion of the arrest of a sister ship under the Convention.237  
Secondly according to the Minister of Justice, the associated ship provisions 
merely extended a fundamental principle of South African company law.238 A third 
reason for viewing the provisions merely as extension of existing rights and remedies 
is, of course, the civil law tradition in South Africa of the attachment of any property 
of the defendant’s within the jurisdiction.239 The tradition meant that arrest of a ship 
                                                        
232 Ibid at 245-6. 
233 Hilton (1996-97) (note 166) at 412. 
234 Wallis (note 6) at 207. 
235 Hilton (1966-97) (note 151) at 413. 
236 Ibid 415. 
237 Ibid at 417. 
238 Hansard (note 170). 












other than the guilty ship would not, as a concept, be entirely new; albeit that the 
purpose of an arrest in rem of an associated ship is different from the attachment of 
any property of a foreign defendant within the jurisdiction of the court.240  
When the Colonial Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction over the maritime claims 
there was no need to arrest the ship in rem to find jurisdiction, the action in rem, the 
foundation of which was a maritime lien or claim upon the res, commenced with the 
issues of the writ of summons and was thus dependent upon a common law arrest to 
found jurisdiction of the court.241 
 Finally, the notion of the arrest or attachment of property, apart from the guilty ship, 
is back dated to the early history of the English and hence South African Admiralty 
Court, so for these reasons, the associated ship provisions were not entirely new, at 
least in concept.242 
4.6  The Unique Character of the Provisions 
 
The associated ship provisions are strange, even heretical, from the 
prospective of an English lawyer; but they are not unknown by such lawyers 
who frequently have their provisions invoked in South Africa in order to 
provide security for litigation or arbitration contemplated, pending, or 
proceeding in London.243 
The associated provisions are unorthodox because they clearly abscond from the 
fundamental principle of company law, the provisions allow a ship which is owned 
by a corporation to be arrested for a maritime claim against another ship, provided 
the two companies are subject to the same control, under English company law the 
position is different. As Lord Justice Templeman puts it: “A parent company may 
spawn a number of subsidiary companies, all controlled directly or indirectly by the 
shareholders of the parent company. If one of the subsidiary companies, to change 
the metaphor, turns out to be the runt of the litter and declines into insolvency to the 
dismay of the creditors, the parent company and the other subsidiary companies may 
prosper to the joy of the shareholders without any liability for the debts of the 
















insolvent subsidiary.”244The departure from these principles, so long established and 
unchallengeable, constitute the novelty of the associated ship provisions.245 
The adoption of the associated ship concept in South African admiralty law 
has not been followed by other jurisdictions that introduced or reformed their 
admiralty practices after the enactment of the South African Act.246 The Australian 
Law Commission recognised that some form of corporate veil provision would be 
advantageous for local interests but ultimately rejected the idea.247 They are of the 
view that enacting statutory veil piercing provisions might lead to inconsistencies in 
the approach to corporate veil piercing.248 
Hilton says, under the South African statutory ‘veil piercing” regime in relation to 
ship arrests, there is a fundamental difference in approach to the remedy of veil 
piercing between  the context of shipping companies and other contexts.  He also 
asserts that under the “associated ship” arrest provisions, veil piercing is available as 
a matter of course and not as an exceptional remedy.249 It follows also that the tests 
for veil piercing, namely what the corporation is either a mere facade or that there 
has been a failure to maintain the separate existence of the corporation, are 
irrelevant, it is presumed that this is so in every instance and there is no question of 
the exercise of any given instance.250 
  The associated ship provision are not content merely to lift and let fall the veil in 
special circumstances, once the association is established in one claim, all the ships 
of the associated company may stand exposed to arrests for other claims as well.251 
4.7 Conclusion  
 
The new provisions seem to have resolved the problems that were being experienced 
by creditors by providing them with an option to arrest an associated ship, even 
though they are owned different companies. They disregard the principle that 
because companies have separate legal personalities, a ship owned by one company 
cannot, as the traditional rule, be arrested in respect of a claim brought against the 
“guilty ship.”  
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This aallows a maritime creditor to arrest an associated ship instead of the 
“guilty” ship if at the time the claim is sought to be enforced the ship to be arrested 
is owned by a person, or by a company controlled by a person, who at the time the 
claim arose, owned the ship, or controlled the company that owned  the ship in 
respect of which the claim arose is to permit the maritime creditor, as a matter of 
course, to look past the separate corporate entity that owns the vessel to the entity’s 
controller.252  
The provisions may be described as a statutory mode of the of piercing the corporate 
veil. Shipowning companies are treated, as a matter of course, as mere facades 
concealing the identity of the true debtor, once the identity of the debtor is 
established, any ship, other than the guilty vessel, owned or controlled by the “true” 
debtor may be arrested as an associated ship to enforce the maritime claim in 
question.253 
 One argument against the introduction of this jurisdiction is it that may 
require more severe attention in the case of a shipping line that has fallen upon 
difficult times and is seeking to restructure its operations by disposing of vessels that 
cannot be operated profitably.254 
The Australian Law Commission had at first recognised the introduced of 
some sort of corporate veil provision ended up rejecting it. The commission laid 
down some very strong arguments against the introduction of this jurisdiction, that 
the issue has no particular or peculiar maritime aspect, but is a general issue raised 
by the ability to set up corporate bodies. It was suggested that this issue is much 
better dealt with as a subject of general law, instead of admiralty jurisdiction. 
Arguably, the general law at present strikes the appropriate balance in leaving the 
corporate veil intact, cases of fraud apart.255 
Secondly, allowing the veil to be lifted in admiralty has the potential to 
complicate further what is already a highly complicated matter. Even further 
complications would occur if there is insolvency in admiralty involving some or all 
of the same assets as a corporate insolvency under general law.256 
The application of the associated ship arrest provision to shipowning companies has 
generated inconsistencies in the approach to piercing the corporate veil beyond those 
envisaged at the time of the introduction of the provisions. Such inconsistencies may 
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be still tolerable on the grounds that justified the introduction of the differential 
treatment of shipownning companies under the “associated ship” arrest provisions.257 
It is unfortunately in the absence of a reasoned alternative the language that our 
courts continue to use, whether as a result of habit, a failure of analysis or as fig leaf 
to cover the otherwise inexplicable is difficult to tell. One would have thought that 
more than twenty-five years of the associated ship jurisdiction being invoked against 
perfectly respectable groups of companies that are plainly not constituted through 
one-ship companies for any dishonest or dishonourable purpose would have caused 
the courts to pause for reflection before repeating this tired old mantra, but there is 
no sign in their judgments that they have done so.258 
It is submitted that besides the Australian commission’s arguments the South African 
courts appear to not to have difficulties, of course previously the issues of 
retrospective effect was, a problem as Parliament did not state whether the amending 
Act was retrospective, as mentioned above this problem was dealt with and clarified 
in MV Pericles as discussed  above. 
Besides the difficulties and complications that revolve or surround the 
company law doctrine of veil piercing, the Australian Law commission refer to the 
general law not of admiralty jurisdiction to deal with the issue. It is argued that there 
is still a need for something more concrete than just general law, and not  the 
doctrine of piercing the veil is the way orward as it is the only principle in this case 
which seems to fit in with the issues that come to light when dealing with associated 
ship provisions. At the end of it all results are being seem as this principles insures 
that the right people are held liable and cannot hide behind their companies. 
Clearly the justifications for the introduction of this jurisdiction (company 
law) into Admiralty jurisdiction show that this is the right path to take in dealing with 
associated ship arrests, despite some of the criticism note above. One could argue 
that there is no reason why a guilty party should go scorch free because he claims 
that the one ship is owned by a different company which he in turn controls. This 
also encourages companies to be more conscious about their day to day operations as 
they can now be liable for by arrest of the associated ship rather than the guilty ship. 
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5.  CHAPTER FIVE: CORPORATIONS 
5.1  Criminal Liability of Corporations 
 
The increase in corporate crime, including breaches of health and safety regulations 
and environmental degradation perpetrated by companies , as well as the failure of 
public authorities to protect persons in danger, have led countries to the realisation 
that comprehensive criminalisation, based on a coherent theory of corporate liability 
is required.259 
There are a number of theories of corporate liability; (i) the principle of 
‘identification’ which attributes the conduct and state of mind of certain high-
ranking officers in the corporation (representing the directing mind and will of the 
corporation) to the corporate body thus rendering the corporate body directly liable. 
(ii) the principle of ‘aggregation’ where a conviction is based on a derivative, but 
collective, responsibility determined by the aggregation of conduct and states of 
mind within the corporation; and (iii) an organisational model of liability that 
determines fault by examining the institutional practices and corporate policies of 
the institution.260 
The traditional approach to the criminal law is that only a natural person is capable of 
performing an unlawful act with a blameworthy state of mind.261 The current 
approach to criminal liability of corporations in South Africa is in, fact based on 
derivative liability (in which  the conduct and fault of the agent or servant of the 
corporation is imputed to the corporation).262   
This derivative approach of corporate criminal liability has been questioned by legal 
writers in a number of common law jurisdictions. Various proposals for reform have 
emerged, the most innovative of which is a rejection of derivative liability in favour 
of a model envisaging direct corporate liability, and others concerning the creation 
of specific corporate offences involving negligence.263 
5.2  Derivative Models of Corporate Criminal Liability  
(a)  Vicarious liability 
In criminal law no such general principles of vicarious liability is recognised, indeed 
the general rule of the common law is that a person is not liable for the crime of 
another unless he authorised or procured its commission or took part in it.264 
Even so various forms of liability have played an important role in the history if 
corporate criminal liability. As early as 1939, the South African legislature created a 
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very wide form of corporate criminal liability based essentially on the principle of 
vicarious liability. Its essential provisions but are found today in section 332(1) of 
the Criminal Procedure Act, the theoretical basis of the legislation is clearly that a 
corporate body per se is incapable of performing an actus reus and also incapable of 
blameworthy state of mind.265   
Section 332(1) provides as follows:  
(1) For the purpose of 
imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any offence, whether under 
any law or at common law— (a) any act performed, with or without a particular 
intent, by or on instructions or with permission, express or implied, given by a 
director or servant of that corporate body; and (b) the omission, with or without a 
particular intent, of any act which ought to have been but was not performed by or 
on instructions given by a director or servant of that corporate body, in the exercise 
of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or servant or in 
furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate body, shall be 
deemed to have been performed (and with the same intent, if any) by that corporate 
body or, as the case may be, to have been an omission (and with the same intent, if 
any) on the part of that corporate body.266 
Section 332(1) removes the obstacle to impose criminal liability upon an artificial 
person that cannot be found guilty of a crime requiring fault since it has no mind. In 
terms of the subsection, where a corporation is charged with such a crime the fault of 
the director or servant who committed the crime will be imputed to the corporation, 
thus in R v Bennett & Co (pty) Ltd267 the negligence of an employee was imputed to 
the company, resulting in a conviction of the of latter culpable homicide.268 
This section also covers or includes negligence and strict liability, which was 
confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Ex parte Minister van justice: In re S v 
Suid-Afrikaans Untisaaikorporaise.269 Section 332(1) expressly renders the corporate 
body liable where, in committing the crime, the director or servant acted beyond his 
powers or duties, but was nevertheless ‘furthering or endeavouring to further the 
interests of the corporation. 
Liability under the section, therefore, extends beyond the normal limits of vicarious 
responsibility where the principle or master is liable only if the agent or servant 
acted within the scope of his authority or employment.270A distinction should be 
drawn between a director or servant of a corporation who is acting solely for his own 
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personal interests and one who is acting in furtherance, or attempted furtherance, of 
the corporation’s interest. The former individual should not render the corporation 
liable for any crimes committed in furtherance of his own interests, while the latter 
should render the corporation liable under section 332(1).271 
The objection to vicarious liability, that it creates liability without an enquiry 
into fault, applies also to corporate bodies; the distinguishing features of corporate 
bodies do not shield them from any penal costs of a criminal conviction.272 
Although section 332(1) has not as yet been scrutinised from a constitutional 
perspective, a number of South African legal writers have questioned its wide ambit, 
for instance, Du Plessis suggests that criminal liability of corporate bodies should 
not extend beyond crimes committed by the organs that represent the directing mind 
and will of the corporate body. She finds support for this point of view in the 
doctrine of identification, applied in Anglo-American law to establish corporate 
liability for crime requiring culpability.273    
(b)  The doctrine of identification 
 
The idea that corporations can be criminally liable like humans can seem strange, 
since a corporation cannot perform any acts except through human individuals or 
have a state of mind independently of one or more individuals within the 
organisation.274 The courts have invented the fiction that acts and state of mind of 
certain senior managers or officials are the acts and state of mind of the corporation, 
what the senior executive does is identified, and becomes the acts of the company 
itself.275 
 In some versions of the doctrine, these personnel are said to represent the 
“directing mind” of the corporation.276  Lord Denning’s metaphor in the civil case of 
H.L. Bolton (Engineering) Co. v. T.J. Graham & Sons, Ltd,277 explains the notion:  
“A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a brain and nerve 
centre which controls what it does. It also has hands which hold the tools and act in 
accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company are 
mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and 
cannot be said to represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who 
represent the directing mind and will of the company, and control what it does. The 
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state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by 
the law as such.”278 
There is judicial power which insists that corporate liability on the foundation of 
identification is theoretically quite separate from vicarious liability.279 In light of the 
identification doctrine, the company's guilt is demonstrated rather than attributed to 
it, yet a scrutiny of those terms reveals identification to be cognate to vicarious 
liability.280 
Over time, the doctrine became well embedded in both civil and criminal law 
and, with familiarity, an increasingly liberal approach was taken to the question of 
which corporate officials could be identified with the company, this liberality was 
checked by the House of Lords decision in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass281 
where it was ruled that only individuals at the apex of the corporate hierarchy could 
be identified with the company.282 
Lord Diplock took a rigid and formal approach to this question: only officials 
granted plenary authority in the articles of association over a company’s affairs 
could be so indentified. For him, that would include the board of directors making 
decisions on behalf of the company, together with the chief executive and possibly, 
any other executive possessing plenary authority for the activity at issue in a 
particular case.283 Lord Reid too, required a plenary   authority as opposed to a 
delegated responsibility but was prepared to look at substance as well as form; he 
did not make a grant of authority in the articles of association a precondition for 
identification.284 
The narrowness of the doctrine has been a major obstacle in obtaining 
corporate convictions in the United Kingdom. In R v P & O European ferries 
(Dover) Ltd,285for instance, where the defendant company was charged with 
manslaughter following the Zeebrugge sinking, the ship’s master was found not to be 
a person who could be identified with the company. This was dealt with similarly in 
R v Redfen and Dunlop Ltd286 (aircraft division), were Dunlop Aviation (Europe) was 
charged with knowingly exporting combat equipment to Iran in contravention of 
agreed sanctions. The facts of the matter were known to the European sales manager 
but he was considered insufficiently important in Dunlop’s scheme of things to be 
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identified with his company. Such outcomes have led to criticisms of the 
identification principle.  
Jordaan states that the main objections to this approach is  that, the doctrine 
as applied in English law does not reflect modern corporate practice, particularly in 
larger companies where decision making is the product of corporate policies and 
procedures on various levels in the organisation, rather than that of a single 
individual at the top level.287 
Fisse and Braithwaite explain:  
‘Offences committed on behalf of large concerns are often visible only at the level of 
middle management whereas the principle [of identification] requires proof of fault 
on the part of a top-level manager. By contrast, fault on the part of a top-level 
manager is much easier to prove in the context of small companies. Yet that is the 
context where there is usually little need to impose corporate criminal liability in 
addition to individual criminal liability.’288  
An objection to the doctrine of identification is that it distorts the allocation of 
liability between large and small corporations, while in fact many significant 
decisions in large corporations are taken at the level of branch or at the level of 
middle management.289 A corporation will be insulated from liability for these 
decisions unless the identification doctrine is given very broad scope.290 Furthermore 
the identification liability is the same as the vicarious liability in any of its forms, a 
corporation's liability turns on the conduct of corporate personnel rather than on the 
presence of corporate fault.291  
A company may have taken all reasonable precautions to prevent an offence and 
nevertheless be liable.292 However, the Supreme Court of Appeal's decision in the 
SABC case,293 demonstrates that this objection can also be raised in respect of a 
broad version of vicarious corporate criminal liability as applied in South Africa.294 
 In the United Kingdom, the Law Commission for England and Wales has 
proposed a statutory version that identifies "controlling officers" as the persons from 
whom liability may be derived and gives the following definition of this 
class: "Controlling officer" of a corporation means a person participating in the 
control of the corporation in the capacity of a director, manager, secretary or other 
similar officer (whether or not he was, or was validly, appointed to any such 
office).295 The Supreme Court of Canada, in Canadian Dredge & Dock,296 
endorsed the basic principle of Tesco Supermarkets but qualified its 
                                                        
287 Jordaan (note 10 ) at 55. 
288 Brent Fisse and  John Braithwaite ‘The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability’(1988) 11 Sydney L.Rev. 468 at 504. 
289 Colvin (note 276) at 15. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Ibid . 
292  Jordaan (note 10) at 56. 
293 Ex parte (note 269). 
294  Jordaan at 56. 
295 Colvin (note 276) at 10. 












application in a way that could extend the scope of corporate liability under 
the identification theory.297  
The Supreme Court agreed with the House of Lords that the key idea is that 
of a "directing mind" with whom the corporation can be identified. The Court 
rejected, however, any notion that a corporation necessarily has a single directing 
mind, wielding centralized authority;  Justice Estey argued that the 
organizational structures of many modern corporations divide authority in a 
way that creates more than one directing mind298:“[A] corporation may . . . 
have more than one directing mind. This must be particularly so in a country 
such as Canada where corporate operations are frequently geographically 
widespread. The transportation companies, for example, must of necessity 
operate by the delegation and sub-delegation of authority from the corporate 
centre; by the division and subdivision of the corporate brain; and by 
decentralizing by delegation the guiding forces in the corporate undertaking. 
The application of the identification rule in Tesco may not accord with the 
realities of life in our country, however appropriate we may find to be the 
enunciation of the abstract principles of the law made.”299 
In the United States, the position in relation to State criminal laws is more 
complex, some states have adopted more sophisticated statutory provisions 
concerning corporate liability, based, in some cases, on the Model Penal Code.300 
Although no mention is made of a 'directing mind,' the Code, inter alia, makes a 
corporation liable for the conduct of its board of directors or any 'high managerial 
agent' acting on behalf of the corporation.301  
The U.S. formulations appear to place more stress than do the Commonwealth ones 
on the idea that the conduct should, in some sense, reflect corporate policy, 
moreover, some formulations have required that corporate management "tolerate" 
the activity.302 This requirement, however, is interpreted loosely, so that tolerance 
may be diagnosed even in the face of an express prohibition.303 
Some recent Australian and Canadian proposals for the codification or recodification 
of criminal law have recommended an expansion of corporate liability beyond the 
scope of the Tesco Supermarkets principle. More radical proposals for 
organizational liability are contained in the Australian Model Criminal Code.304 
 Nevertheless, the Model Criminal Code does include a version of the identification 
doctrine as one of the ways of establishing corporate liability for offenses involving 
subjective fault. The formulation, like that of the U.S. Model Penal Code, allows the 
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culpability of the board of directors or of a "high managerial agent" to be transferred 
to the corporation, "high managerial agent" is defined as "a servant, agent or 
employee or officer of the body corporate with duties of such responsibility that his 
or her conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the body 
corporate.305  
There has been some disagreement about the nature of identification liability 
and its relationship to vicarious liability. The simplest and most sensible explanation 
is that identification liability is a modified form of vicarious liability, under which 
the liability of a restricted range of personnel is imputed to a corporation. Instead of 
all employees and agents having the capacity to make the corporation liable, only 
some category of persons with directorial or managerial responsibilities has this 
capacity.306   
(c)  The principle of aggregation 
 
The third basis of corporate liability is the aggregation theory which allows the 
aggregate or combined fault of a number of individuals, each of whom in himself 
lacks the required means to be imputed to the company thus fixing it with liability.307 
The aggregation theory is based on the view that frequently no one individual within 
a company was sufficiently at fault but that cumulatively the organisation might be 
considered to possess the requisite of fault.308 
The principle of aggregation has been applied in American federal law to 
establish corporate criminal liability.309 In the leading case, United States v Bank 
of New England310, the court concluded that the bank would be liable if some of its 
personnel knew about the reporting requirement and disregarded it, even if this 
requirement were not known to those personnel who knew of the transactions in 
issue. The court endorsed the concept of "collective knowledge" in the context of 
complex organizations:311  
“A collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate in the context of 
corporate criminal liability. . . . Corporations compartmentalize knowledge, 
subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into smaller components. 
The aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge of a 
particular operation.”312 
 The concept of collective knowledge, in its all-encompassing meaning, deals 
with situations that previous models had left unattended. It seeks to expand the 
liability of legal bodies to include additional events, beyond the scope of previous 
doctrines. In this sense, collective knowledge relates to previous doctrines of liability 
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as the theory of direct liability relates to the vicarious liability doctrine.313 The 
aggregation model allows for the conviction of legal bodies within the broad-scoped 
vicarious doctrine of respondent superior, which is dominant in American law, by 
linking the thoughts of different agents of the legal body and thus creating the 
required mental element. The body of knowledge in possession of each of the 
various agents is attributed to the corporation separately, relying on the known rules 
of the vicarious liability doctrine.314 
 Some jurisdictions like the United Kingdom, did not adopt this particular 
concept of criminal liability.The scheme came about in events associated to the 
Zeebrugge ferry315 catastrophe, occurred when the ferry set sail with its bow doors 
still open. The company owning the ferry was ultimately prosecuted for 
manslaughter but the case was stopped by the trial judge on the basis that no one 
person sufficiently senior to be identified with the company displayed the necessary 
fault for manslaughter. The courts where not convinced by the virtues of aggregation 
as this can be seem from  Bingham J’s option in R v HM Coroner for East Kent, ex 
parte Spooner.316 Bingham J stated:  
‘Whether the defendant is a corporation or a personal defendant, the ingredients of 
manslaughter must be established by proving the necessary mens rea and actus reus 
of manslaughter against it or him by evidence properly to be relied on against it or 
him. A case against a personal defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against 
another defendant. The case against a corporation can only be made by evidence 
properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation as such.’317 
 Gobert states that; ‘Bingahm. J’s premise that the case against a personal 
defendant cannot be fortified by evidence against another defendant is correct, but 
his conclusion that ‘a case against a corporation can only be made by evidence 
properly addressed to showing guilt on the part of the corporation’ does not follow. 
Guilt against an individual is by definition personal. The defendant on trial will 
suffer the stigma and sanctions of a criminal conviction. The defendant obviously 
should not be convicted on the basis of another person’s acts or state of mind. But 
the purpose of the prosecution of company is not to blame any particular individual 
but to determine whether there was corporate fault. The responsibility sought to be 
affixed is not individual but collective, and any punishment will be sought to be 
affixed is not individual but collective, and any punishment will be borne by the 
company as a whole.’318 
 The High Court of Australia also rejected the aggregation principle in 
R v Australia Films Ltd,319the case involved; Charges connected to claims by a 
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company for refund of duties it had paid on imported films, the required proof of 
intent to defraud, the usage of the films was unknown to the employee who had 
made the claims, in the trial judge’s view, this gap was because of poor book 
keeping practices of the company.320 However, the High Court held that the only 
state of mind that can be imputed to a corporation is that of the individual who 
performs the prohibited act.321 
 Proposals to introduce some form of aggregation have been made recently in 
Australia and Canada. In Australia, the focus has been on the aggregation of 
negligence.322 The Model Criminal Code prepared by the Criminal Law Officers 
Committee states that a corporation is negligent if the conduct of the body corporate 
when viewed as a whole (that is, by aggregating the conduct of any number of its 
servants, employees or officers) is negligent.323 In general, the idea of aggregation 
has found the greatest favour where negligence is at stake and a decision has to be 
made about whether a collective failure to exercise reasonable care was culpable or 
about how great the measure of culpability was.324  
Smith and Hogan are prepared to accept the usefulness of the idea in relation to 
offenses of negligence, although they dismiss out of hand its application to problems 
of subjective fault:  
‘It is submitted that it is not possible to artificially create a mens rea in this way. 
Two innocent states of mind cannot be added together to produce a guilty state of 
mind. Any such doctrine could have no application in offenses requiring knowledge, 
intention or recklessness; but, arguably, there is a place for it in offenses of 
negligence. The company owes a duty of care and if its operation falls far below the 
standard required it is guilty of gross negligence. A series of minor failures by 
officers of the company might add up to a gross breach by the company of its duty of 
care.’325   
Colvin states that the major objection to aggregation is not that it does 
violence to ordinary language. It is, rather, that it distorts the nature of corporate 
criminal liability, as long as aggregation is presented within a framework of 
vicarious or identification liability it carries an air of artificiality. The qualification to 
the model of derivative liability is so great that the usefulness of the basic model is 
called into question. Moreover, once the derivative model is abandoned in favour of 
a model of true organizational responsibility, aggregation becomes a weak 
conceptual tool. At best, aggregation can be viewed as only one part of a broader 
conceptual framework for tackling issues of organizational responsibility.326 
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5.3  Organisational Models of Corporate Criminal Liability  
 
Recently, there has been increased focus on an alternative model of liability, focused 
on the acts or omissions of the corporation itself. Under this model, rather than the 
corporation being liable for the acts of individual offenders, a corporation is liable 
because it’s 'culture', policies, practices, management or other characteristics 
encouraged or permitted the commission of the offence. Australia is a prime 
example of this 'organisational' liability model.327  
The argument is that the behaviour of individuals is often shaped by their 
relationship to groups and collectives.328 Because a collective entity, such as a 
company, provides the structural context for individual conduct of company officers, 
the company per se may incur civil and criminal liability, hence corporate criminal 
liability need not be derivative of the culpability of individuals associated with the 
company.329 Jordaan states that, the challenge has been to locate the actus reus and 
fault required for criminal liability in organisations.330  
Field and Jorg argue that the policies, standing orders, regulations and institutional 
practices of corporations are evidence of corporate aims, intentions and knowledge 
that are not reducible to the aims, intentions and knowledge of individuals within the 
corporation. Such regulations and standing orders are authoritative, not because any 
particular individual devised them, but because they have emerged from a decision-
making process recognised as authoritative within the corporation. These regulations 
and standing orders are also evidence of corporate capacity to differentiate right 
from wrong and act accordingly, to think ethically in terms of the consequences of 
corporate actions for others and to give reasoned explanations to the outside 
world.331   
5.4  The United Kingdom 
 
An organisational model of criminal liability was introduced by the Law 
Commission in England and Wales in respect of one particular offence, namely 
corporate manslaughter.332 Following the failure of the prosecution of the company 
in the Zeebrugger disaster333 the Law commission suggested the introduction of an 
organisation model of criminal liability. 
They recommended (1) that there should be a special offence of corporate killing, 
broadly corresponding to the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness;(2) 
the corporate offence should be committed only where the defendant’s conduct in 
causing the death falls far below what could reasonably be expected;(3) that the 
corporate offence should not require that the risk be obvious; (4)that for the purposes 
of the corporate offence, a death should be regarded as having been caused by the 
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conduct of a corporation if it is caused by a failure, in the way in which the 
corporation’s activities are managed  or organised.334 
These recommendations were taken on into “The Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007,” which received its Royal Assent on 26 July 2007 and 
most of the Act was brought into force on 6 April 2008.  The main section that deals 
with the provisions that concern corporate manslaughter are found in section 1 of the 
Act.335 Although the Act appears to create a broader-reaching offence in terms of bodies to 
which it will apply and the duties of care which will trigger liability, these are severely 
curtailed by the technical qualification integral to that all important duty questions and by the 
numerous far reaching exclusions designed to protect public bodies. The layers of 
technicality serve to restrict the scope of liability far more than would at first appear, and are 
also likely to lead to substantial practical difficulties in prosecution.336 
 In order to establish liability, the prosecution will have to prove that, (i)a 
qualified organisation (ii) which owed a relevant duty of care to the victim and (iii) 
caused the death of the victim; and (iv) and that the death was attributed to a gross 
breach of a relevant duty (gross breach being defined as conduct falling‘far below 
what could reasonably have been expected of the organisation in the 
circumstances’);and (v) that the way in which the organisation’s activities were 
managed or organised by its senior management constituted a substantial element in 
the gross breach.337  
The offence follows many of the core aspects of gross negligence manslaughter. The 
crucial difference is that rather than being contingent on the guilt of one or more 
individuals, liability for the organisation are run.338  
Section 20 of the Act abolishes the common law offence of manslaughter by 
gross negligence in its application to corporations, and in any application it has to 
other organisations which the Act applies. The Act also provides that an individual 
cannot be guilty of aiding, abetting or procuring the commission of an offence of 
corporate manslaughter.339 Individuals within the companies can of course still be 
prosecuted for gross negligence manslaughter as principal offenders subject to what 
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has been said above.340 Under section 19 an organisation can be liable for corporate 
manslaughter or homicide for an offence under any health and safety legislation.  
Section 1(5) provides that the offence under this section is called- (a) corporate 
manslaughter, in so far as it is an offence under the law of England and Wales or 
Northern Ireland. Ormerod argues that, this is misleading because it can be 
committed by certain organisations other than corporations.341 Section 1(2) applies 
the offence to a corporation, a department or other body listed in Schedule 1; a police 
force; and a partnership, or trade union or employers’ association, that is an 
employer. Relevant duty of care is defined in section 2 of the Act as:  
A “relevant duty of care”, in relation to an organisation, means any of the 
following duties owed by it under the law of negligence— 
(a) a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the 
organisation or performing services for it; (b) a duty owed as occupier of     
premises;(c) a duty owed in connection with— (i) the supply by the 
organisation of goods or services (whether for consideration or not), (ii) the 
carrying on by the organisation of any construction or maintenance 
operations,(iii) the carrying on by the organisation of any other activity on a 
commercial basis, or (iv) the use or keeping by the organisation of any plant, 
vehicle or other thing; (d) a duty owed to a person who, by reason of being a 
person within subsection (2), is someone for whose safety the organisation is 
responsible.342 
The duties reflect the duties of care at common law, the duty is owned in the 
common law of negligence or where applicable the statutory duty which has 
superseded the common law duty, for example, the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. It 
is made clear by s 2(4) that a duty owned under the law of negligence will apply if 
the common law duty of negligence has been superseded by statutory  provision 
imposing strict liability.343 It is easy to see how the categories might give rise to 
duties of care which, if breached, could lead to fatalities, duties as employer would 
include duties to provide safe place of work.344 
 Section 2(2) lists the various forms of custody or detention which will 
prompt a duty. Deaths in custody give rise to problems because of the particular 
status of the victim; that by definition the activities will be occurring within premises 
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and the fact that the organisation providing the detention service is one which have to 
make public policy decisions at to allocation of resources.345 
 Another element required for the offence is that the breach must be as a 
result of the way the activities are managed or organised. This test is not linked to a 
particular level of management but considers how an activity was managed within 
the organisation as a whole, the language is designed to reflect the concentration 
things done consistently with the organisation’s culture and policies more 
generally.346 
 Under  section 1(3): an oganisation is guilty of an offence under this section only if 
the way in which its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is 
a substantial element in the breach referred to in subsection (1). Senior management 
is defined in section 1(4) (c) as the persons who plays significant roles in (i) the 
making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its activities are to 
be managed or organised, or (ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a 
substantial part of those activities.  
It is stated that this goes further than the constricted category of senior individuals 
(directing minds) who are referred to in the identification doctrine. The senior 
managers’ management and organisation must be a significant aspect in the breach of 
duty that causes the death.   
The consequences being that the senior manager’s’ involvement, and conduct of 
others -non senior managers’ who are involved in the management and organisation 
of activities is also relevant. Secondly when assessing the management failure the 
contribution of those individuals who are not senior management can be taken into 
account even if their involvement is substantial provided it is not so great as to 
render the senior management involvement something less than substantial.347 
 Ormerod states that the requirement of a gross breach of duty is clearly 
designed to echo the gross negligence manslaughter offence at common law and that 
section 2(4) provides a more detailed explanation, of the concept a breach of a duty 
of care by an organisation is a gross breach of the conduct alleged to amount to a 
breach of that duty falls far below what can reasonably be expected of the 
organisation in the circumstances.348 The jury’s duty in relation to determining the 
breach of duty is provided in section 8, the section also notes that the jury is obliged 
to consider whether the organisation complied, not just whether its senior 
management complied, this further supports the argument that the activities of non 
senior managers are relevant in determining whether there has been a management 
failure.349 
 Of course some academics have described the Act as a 
disappointment for instance Gobert argues that; the Act is restricted to one 
statistically minor (in terms of its incidence although clearly not in terms of the 
seriousness of the harm caused) dimension of a much more complex problem 
injuries and deaths caused by an organisation’s blatant disregard for the safety and 
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welfare of employees, consumers and members of the public.350 Further, through its 
requirement that persons who play a significant role in the formulation and/or 
implementation of organisation policy be shown to have made a substantial 
contribution to the corporate offence, the Act threatens to perpetuate the same 
evidentiary stumbling blocks that frustrated prosecutions under the identification 
doctrine.351   
The Acts categories of what qualifies as an organisation is criticised for being 
too broad, it should have been restricted to for-profit organisations as a measure of 
deterring companies from putting profit ahead of safety.352 The duties listed in 
section 3 of the Act are an importation from the civil law of negligence, and where 
given the status of an element of gross negligence manslaughter by the House of 
Lords in Adomako,353a prosecution involving a natural person.354  The court of 
Appeal in Wacker355 questioned the authenticity of theses duties in criminal 
context.356 
 The author argues that the definition of gross negligence357 begs several 
important questions: (1) how to determine what is to be reasonably expected of 
organisations under different circumstances (if judged by what similarly situated 
organisations do, the test may turn out to be a recipe for an across-the-board 
lowering of industry standards); (2) exactly how far below reasonable expectations 
must an organisation’s breach fall before it can be characterised as ‘gross’ 
(LordMackay’s response in Adomako that the deviation had to be‘so bad in all the 
circumstances . . . that it should be judged criminal’ is obviously circular) and 
against what benchmarks can this be measured; and (3) what ‘circumstances’ are 
relevant when considering liability (presumably a company’s lack of profitability 
would not justify its ignoring basic safety requirements, but the lack of clarity in the 
term ‘circumstances’ leaves open the possibility).358 
Furthermore this Act has been criticised for being too narrowly conceived 
from the outset, instead of addressing the generic problem of corporate wrong doing 
and how to hold organisations accountable for illegality whatever form it might take, 
the Act is restricted to cases of homicide.359 
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There has been an increasing tendency in Australian statutes to impose individual 
liability on company directors and managers, on the premise that targeting such 
individuals for liability will promote greater monitoring by them.360 A number of 
policy reasons have been advanced for the development of corporate criminal 
liability. 
 These policy justifications relate to matters such as the opacity of the corporation, 
which makes it sometimes difficult to identify or gather evidence against the 
wrongdoer within the enterprise; the potential for scapegoating within the 
organization; the existence of devices such as indemnification, which may insulate 
top management from the effects of personal liability; and the existence of some 
inherently "organizational" wrongs such as failure to have adequate systems in place 
to provide a check on human error.361  
The Australian Criminal Code Act 91362 recognises true corporate fault as the basis 
for criminal liability for offences requiring negligence as well as offences requiring 
subjective fault.363 The Criminal Code is based upon the findings of a sub-committee 
of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General from Federal, State and Territory 
Governments, which was formed to consider the development of a uniform criminal 
code for Australian jurisdictions, the Committee’s Report concluded that the Tesco 
principle was "no longer appropriate" as the touchstone for corporate criminal 
liability, in view of more diffuse governance structures and delegation to junior 
officers of corporations. The Report instead favoured adoption of a species of 
corporate criminal liability which recognised independent corporate fault and would 
cast a substantially broader and "much more realistic net of responsibility over 
corporations" than the narrow liability under Tesco.364 
 The Committee’s alternative model of corporate criminal liability is now 
found in Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code.365 Section 12.1 provides that the Code 
applies, with necessary modifications, equally to bodies corporate as to natural 
persons, specifying that a "body corporate may be found guilty of any offence, 
including one punishable by imprisonment". Section 12.2 imposes vicarious liability 
upon the corporation for the physical elements (though not the mental element) of the 
offence when committed by any employee, agent or officer within the actual of 
apparent scope of employment. This departs from the Tesco principle, where the 
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physical elements of the offence must be attributable to a high-level officer.366 Under 
s 12.3(1) of the Criminal Code, the requisite element of fault in an offence, 
characterised by, for example, intention, knowledge or recklessness, is established on 
the part of the body corporate itself, where the body corporate has "expressly, tacitly 
or impliedly authorised or permitted the commission of the offence." The means by 
which such an authorisation or permission may be established in two ways; firstly 
proof that the board of directors or a high managerial agent intentionally, knowingly 
or recklessly carried out the relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.367  
Secondly proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engaged in the relevant conduct or permitted 
the commission of the offence.368 However the company may have a defence in the 
case if offences committed by high managerial agent of the company proves, on a 
balance of probabilities that it exercised due diligence to prevent the conduct.369 
 It is, however, the last two means by which authorisation or permission by the 
corporation may be established which truly break new ground under Australian 
corporate criminal law.370 Thus under s 12.3(2)(c) and (d), the corporation will be 
taken to have authorised or permitted the commission of an offence if it is proved 
that a corporate culture" existed, which either actively encouraged non-compliance371 
or failed to promote compliance.372 Corporate culture is defined as 'an attitude, 
policy, rule course of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate 
generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take 
place'.373  
The concept of "corporate culture" focuses on blameworthiness at an 
organizational level, in the sense that the corporation's practices and procedures have 
contributed in some way to the commission of the offence.374Gill states that, for 
liability to be attributed to the corporation by these means, there is no level in the 
corporate hierarchy beneath which attribution of liability to the corporation is 
impossible. Rather the key issue will be whether the organizational structure of the 
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corporation was such that the relevant act of non-compliance could occur at any 
level.375 
 Indeed in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Criminal Code Bill 1994, it 
is expressly stated that the new provisions would now catch managerial techniques 
against which Tesco was powerless  such as when employees, under implied threat 
of dismissal, are given production deadlines which cannot be met without, for 
example, breaches of safety legislation.376 The concept of corporate culture is also 
perceived to extend Tesco by allowing the prosecution to examine a company's 
"unwritten rules", if these are inconsistent with formal compliance documentation. 
The unwritten rules of an organisation may, admittedly, be difficult to prove.377 
The Criminal Code sets out some factors that may be relevant in determining 
whether  corporate culture exists.  
Section 12.3(4) states that the relevant factors include: (a) whether authority to 
commit an offence of the same or a similar character had been given by a high 
managerial agent of the body corporate; and (b) whether the employee, agent or 
officer of the body corporate who committed the offence believed on reasonable 
grounds, or entertained a reasonable expectation, that a high managerial agent of the 
body corporate would have authorised or permitted the commission of the offence.378 
Although the fault element can be located in the culture of the corporation, 
even though it is not present in any individual, it is still required that the actus reus 
of an offence be performed by an employee, agent or officer of a body corporate 
acting within the actual or apparent scope of his or her employment.379  
The physical element of the offence (the actus reus) is attributed to the body 
corporate.380 The Act also introduced the principle of aggregation in establishing 
corporate negligence.381 
 The provisions have also been criticised for blurring the fault element of 
offences, under the provisions, a corporation will be liable if it merely 'authorised or 
permitted' the offence.' Authorising or permitting' an offence is different to the fault 
element of the offence itself as it would apply to an individual (for example, 
intention or recklessness).382 This is particularly problematic because s12 deals 
uniformly with different fault elements (intention, knowledge and recklessness), 
reducing them all to the same 'authorised or permitted' threshold for corporations. 
However, this is an almost inevitable corollary of the fact that corporations do not 
have the mental capacities of natural persons, and the "corporate" state of mind is 
not amenable to the same distinctions.383  
Areas of uncertainty include how 'corporate culture' is to be ascertained, and the 
scale on which 'corporate culture' will be assessed, particularly in circumstances in 
which the 'corporate culture' of a particular corporate group or entity was acceptable, 
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but the culture in particular business divisions or office sites was deficient. It may be 
very difficult to obtain evidence of a corporation's 'culture', and particularly to 
pinpoint the corporation's 'culture' at a particular moment in time.384 
5.6  Conclusion 
 
The problem with the criminal law is that its concepts were developed for individual 
acts or omissions committed by human individuals. Large companies are not simply 
the sum of the individuals employed; they are organisations which have their own 
systems and because of the vast organisational edifice of larger companies, it may be 
impossible for an outsider to identify any controlling officer whose actions or 
inactions and whose blameworthiness have led to the commission of the offence.385 
Hence there is a need for an organisational model that takes into account 
various factors in determining corporate liability especially with large 
companies. 
In light of the developments discussed above, dealing with the different models of 
corporate liability it is submitted that there a need for South Africa to consider some 
form of reform to a more organisational model of corporate liability, the reasons 
being that, derivate models of corporate liability have proved to be problematic for 
example; the objection to the principle of vicarious liability that it creates liability 
without an investigation into fault. 
The principle of identification has its own flaws, on significant one, is its 
narrowness which is caused problems as shown in the case of ferries discussed 
above. It is also outdated in that it proves difficult to identify one particular 
individual especially in today’s large corporations, as most decision making is dealt 
with via policies and procedures on different levels in the organisation than on 
identifiable individual. Another issue is that this principle seems to target to 
management this brings about problems when the actually decision was made by 
middle management of rather the particular individual can not be identified. On the 
other hand the aggregation principle at first instance seems promising to deal with 
some aspects of the issues surrounding the identification theory. The idea of finding 
fault within a selected group (officers having the knowledge) could be aggregated 
and imputed to the corporation seems has in some jurisdictions been accepted.  
It is submitted that this seems to be a form of vicarious liability, this methods 
seems to border the lines of which persons can be found liable. Even if the mental 
                                                        
384 Ibid. 












states of various employees were to be aggregated, there is still the question of whose 
knowledge may be said to represent the company for the purposes of aggregation.386 
Presumably it could only be knowledge of those who represent the directing mind 
and will whose mental states may be aggregated, as only they may be said to embody 
the company, if this is so aggregation is unlikely to be of much assistance as the 
same difficulties in identifying the directing mind and will would have to be 
addressed, but this time in respect of a range of people.387 
 Furthermore, having addressed the traditional concepts and principles of 
corporate liability, it is submitted that there is a need for the South African legislature 
to consider a more broad approach and adopt an organisational model of criminal 
liability.  The examples given above bring to light how countries like the United 
Kingdom and Australia have adapted this principle. It is suggested that there is a 
need to introduce a broad model of corporate criminal liability based on the concept 
of organisational fault. This will of course entail bringing the focus of criminal 
liability on policies, corporate culture and institutional practices. There is a need to 
narrow down section 332(1) as it holds the corporate body liable in circumstances 
were the director or servant acted beyond his powers or duties in committing the 
crime but while endeavouring to further the interests of the company. It is suggested 
that the corporation should only be held liable to a director or servant that was acting 
to furthering the interests of the company, the individual acting to further his own 
interests should not hold the corporation liable.  
 The traditional principles of criminal law namely actus reus and mens rea 
need to be adapted to apply also in the corporate context. Such adaptation may 
involve the following innovations: Recognition of compliance with the conduct 
element required for a crime if the culture or institutionalised practises of a 
corporation encouraged or caused its occurrence by means of a positive act or 
omission.388 The corporation should be able of being found liable of homicide if 
corporate negligence can be evidenced. Also in terms of omissions for example if the 
corporation fails to create safe environments or fails to comply with some protection 
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legislation.  The notion of corporate culture should be considers as this looks to more 
of the rules and practices of the corporations which are not set in stone writing.  
There is also a need for some use of criminal sanctions to punish corporations 
for negligence. The fine has been the most common sanctioning penalty attributed to 
corporations because of the notion that corporations cannot be imprisoned like 
human beings.   
As Clough and Mulhern demonstrate, there is a range of more creative 
penalties available to those who are prepared to look further than monetary penalties 
and or sanctions. Publicity as a court-ordered sanction is designed to have a punitive 
impact upon the corporation, ‘corporate problem’ and ultimately, in severe cases, the 
corporate equivalent of imprisonment could apply restraint, immobilization and an 
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